Utah v. Friis : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Utah v. Friis : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Jan Graham, Scott M. Burns; attorneys for appellee.
D. Bruce Oliver; D. Bruce Oliver, P.C.; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Robert Friis, No. 960445 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/348
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT FRIIS, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 960445-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IRON COUNTY, THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES 
PRESIDING 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
D. Bruce Oliver, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101-1218 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Post Office Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT FRIIS, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 960445-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, IRON COUNTY, THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES 
PRESIDING 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
D. Bruce Oliver, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101-1218 
210 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Post Office Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDGE'S UNSWORN COMMENT TO COUNSEL OUTSIDE 
THE JURY'S PRESENCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
"TESTIMONY" 9 
II. DEFENDANT'S JUDICIAL NOTICE CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED AND THEREFORE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS 
COURT 12 
III. THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED AT TRIAL TO PROVE 
FACTS OF WHICH THE TRIAL COURT HAD TAKEN JUDICIAL 
NOTICE 14 
IV. DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE, PREMATURE CHARGING, AND JURISDICTION 
ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 16 
IV-A. A FOREIGN CUSTODY AWARD NEED NOT BE REGISTERED 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH IN ORDER TO SUPPORT A CHARGE 
OF CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE 19 
V. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATUTORY SUBSECTION 
MAKING CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE A FELONY IF THE CHILD 
IS "REMOVED AND TAKEN FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER" 
DOES NOT APPLY TO NON-RESIDENTS OF UTAH IS 
UNPRESERVED AND INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 26 
A. This claim was not preserved below 26 
B. This claim is inadequately briefed 27 
i 
VI. BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADDRESS THE PROPRIETY 
OF THE DISMISSAL OF HIS FIRST TRIAL IN LIGHT OF 
THE CONTROLLING STATUTE, HIS DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM 
IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 28 
CONCLUSION 33 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Relevant statutes 
Addendum B - Amended information 
Addendum C - Exemplified copy of Stipulation re Custody 
And Visitation 
Addendum D - Exemplified copy of Default Judgment 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
In re D.S.K.. 792 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 1990) 23 
Holm v. Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992) . . . . 20, 23 
Logan Citv v. Carlson. 799 P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990) . . . . 32 
Millett v. Clark Clinic. 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980) 24 
Nielsen v. Nielsen. 620 P.2d 511 (Utah 1980) 27 
In re Smith. 925 P.2d 169 (Utah 1996) 24 
State v. Adams. 830 P.2d 310 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) 3 
State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) 13 
State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1991) 13 
State v. Dav. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991) 13 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 1, 4 
State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50 (Utah App. 1996) 13 
State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Higgenbotham. 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996) 23 
State v. Jennings. 875 P.2d 566 (Utah App. 1994) 13 
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902 (Utah App. 1990) 32 
State v. Lamorie. 610 P.2d 342 (Utah 1980) 23 
State v. Lawrence. 234 P.2d 600 (Utah 1951) 14 
State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1992) 13 
State v. Nilson. 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 31, 32 
State v. Pascoe. 774 P.2d 512 (Utah App. 1989) 13 
iii 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 2 
State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) 32 
State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992) 13 
State v. Ranael. 866 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1993) 27 
State v. Smith. 764 P.2d 997 (Utah App. 1988) 21, 27 
State v. Snvder. 932 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1997) 18 
State v. Steraer. 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) 13 
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 252 (Utah App. 1994) 15 
State v. Streeter. 900 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1995), 
cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) 13 
State v. Swain. 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 1992) 32 
State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996) 32 
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 4 
State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989) 13 
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah App. 1991) 15 
York v. Shulsen. 875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994), 18 
DOCKETED CASES 
State v. Castle. No. 960755-CA (Utah App. January 2, 
1998) 31, 33 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
28 U.S.C. 1738A 23 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1995) 3, 30, 31 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (1995) 3 
iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (1995) 3, 9, 14, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1997) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l 3, 19, 22, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l ' 20, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-15 25 
OTHER WORKS CITED 
30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments (1994) 22 
Blacks Law Dictionary 1476 (6th ed. 1990) 12 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 960445-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT FRIIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for custodial interference, 
a third degree felony, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron 
County, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1997) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. By making an unsworn comment to counsel outside the jury' s 
presence, did the judge give "testimony" in violation of rule 605, 
Utah Rules of Evidence? 
Because this issue was not raised below, the plain error standard 
applies. To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate 
three elements: (i) An error occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; 
and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 
(Utah 1993) . If any one of these elements is missing, there is no 
plain error. Id. at 1209. 
2. Has defendant adequately briefed his judicial notice claim 
where he cites no statute, case, or rule of evidence? 
This issue does not require this Court to review any action of 
the trial court. Accordingly, no standard of review applies. 
3. Was the State required to prove facts of which the trial 
court took judicial notice? 
To the extent this issues restates issue No. 2, see issue No., 
2 above. 
To the extent this issue presents a sufficiency claim, this Court 
will "review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. [It will] reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted) ; accord State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994) . 
4. Are defendant' s claims based on insufficiency of evidence, 
premature charging, and jurisdiction properly before this Court? 
This issue does not require this Court to review any action of 
the trial court. Accordingly, no standard of review applies. 
4a. Must a foreign custody award be domesticated in the State 
of Utah in order to support a charge of custodial interference? 
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"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's 
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error." State v. 
Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 313 (UtahApp.) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
5. Has defendant preserved and adequately briefed his claim 
that the statutory subsection making custodial interference a felony 
if the child is ''removed and taken from one state to another" does 
not apply to non-residents of Utah? 
This issue does not require this Court to review any action of 
the trial court. Accordingly, no standard of review applies. 
6. Has defendant adequately briefed his double jeopardy claim? 
This issue does not require this Court to review any action of 
the trial court. Accordingly, no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This appeal involves the following provisions, set out in addendum 
A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l through -8; and 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l through -26. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information dated 19 January 
1996 with custodial interference, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (1995) (R. 176-77). 
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A jury found defendant guilty as charged, after which he received 
a suspended sentence and was placed on probation (R. 331-35). He 
timely appealed (R. 336). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
In 1987, defendant married Linda Friis (now Linda Pace); their 
only child, Denim, was born in 1991 (R. 720-22) . Before the couple 
separated, defendant repeatedly threatened that if Linda ever divorced 
him, he would take Denim and go to Mexico (R. 739, 741) . Defendant 
had a pilot's license, a passport, and friends living in Mexico (R. 
737-39). 
The couple was divorced on 8 May 1995 (R. 803) . Defendant was 
awarded six weeks of summer visitation with Denim during the summer 
of 1995 (R. 803-04). Linda was awarded one weekend visit after the 
third week of this six-week period (R. 804).2 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites facts from 
the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201# 1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
2
 At trial, the parties stipulated to these custody terms in 
order to avoid confusing the jury with conflicting court 
documents. Although the Stipulation filed in the Superior Court 
of California did provide for defendant to have six weeks of 
visitation at the beginning of the summer, the Default Judgment 
did not incorporate this term. Compare State's exhibit 1 with 
State's exhibit 2 (these exhibits were not received into evidence 
[R. 895]). In reliance on the Default Judgment, Linda believed 
that defendant was entitled to only one week's visitation in June 
1995 (see R. 726-29, 805). 
The judgment was entered by default because the court had 
earlier stricken defendant's pleadings based on his having "acted 
in a manner of exceedingly bad faith with this Court" (Exhibit P-
1, R. 287-88). 
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Defendant had a history of serious problems conforming to the 
court-ordered visitation schedule (R. 810-11) . Visitation exchanges 
took place in the Parowan police station under the supervision of 
Officer Preston Griffiths (R. 654-56). 
Linda was concerned that she did not have an address for 
defendant; he had moved out of their old house and she had no way 
of knowing where he resided (R. 730). Linda told Griffiths that 
defendant "had pretty much ended up with, with nothing" in the divorce 
and that "she was afraid that . . • [defendant] would take Denim 
and something would happen" (R. 675). 
At Linda's request, Officer Griffiths asked defendant for his 
address and telephone number when he came for Denim on 10 June 1995 
(R. 656-57, 882) . Defendant said that he was waiting for a telephone 
line to be installed and would call Officer Griffiths the following 
Tuesday and give him the number (R. 657, 883) . Defendant also gave 
Officer Griffiths a Riverside address (R. 656). Defendant told the 
officer that he was taking Denim for six weeks (R. 672-73). 
However, it was customary for defendant to have custody of Denim 
for only one week per month (R. 724) . In keeping with this custom, 
and based on her reading of the Default Judgment, Linda assumed that 
on 10 June 1995, defendant would be taking Denim for one week (R. 
726, 729, 805). 
Ten days later, Linda spoke to the Parowan police; she was 
concerned because Denim had not been returned and because the address 
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defendant had given was fictitious (R. 658-59, 698, 733) . Nor had 
defendant called the police with his new phone number as promised 
(R. 658, 662-63). Defendant did not grant Linda a weekend visit 
after three weeks as required by the divorce documents, and six weeks 
later, he still had not returned Denim (R. 805-06). 
On 25 July 1995, six weeks and three days after defendant picked 
up Denim, Linda hired Mark Swagger of Northwest Investigations, a 
private investigation firm, to find Denim (R. 735, 807, 836, 840) . 
One week later, Swagger talked to an associate of defendant's who 
was able to page defendant and a meeting was set up in a restaurant 
in Alta Loma, California (R. 841-42). 
Defendant, who appeared "semi-agitated," told Swagger that he 
had Denim (R. 842). He also told Swagger that "he knew somebody 
would be looking for him because he had the child too long" (R. 845, 
861) • Defendant also claimed that "he thought he had him like six 
weeks" (R. 871). Defendant agreed to drop Denim off at the Ontario 
airport on the following Sunday, 6 August (R. 845-46). 
However, defendant did not drop off Denim at the airport as 
promised (R. 692-93, 735-37, 847).3 Accordingly, Swagger instructed 
his agents to "keep constant pressure on [defendant], his friends, 
his family, anybody that he associated with until we could come up 
with him or Denim" (R. 851) . Based on his experience in trying to 
3
 Linda and her investigators spent over six hours in the 
airport waiting for defendant (R. 692-93, 735, 846-47). 
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locate thousands of persons, Swagger concluded that defendant "was 
actively fleeing or trying to evade us" (R. 852-53, 860) . 
In a conversation during this time, defendant told one of the 
investigators that "he was told not to release the child by his 
attorney" (R. 873) . However, when Swagger contacted him, the attorney 
said that he had not been retained by defendant (R. 874). 
Defendant eventually contacted one of Swagger's investigators 
and asked, "Why are you messing with my family and friends?" (R. 
682-85) . Another meeting was set up and, on 20 August 1995, Denim 
was returned by three women at the Ontario airport (R. 693-97, 853) . 
Defendant had kept Denim from 10 June 1995 to 20 August 1995, 
a period of approximately ten weeks (R. 806). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Judge's "testimony." The judge's unsworn comment to counsel 
outside the jury's presence did not constitute "testimony." 
Accordingly, it did not violate rule 605, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
2. Judicial notice. Defendant's judicial notice claim is 
inadequately briefed. He cites no statute, no case, and no rule 
of evidence to support it. It is therefore not properly before this 
Court. 
3. Sufficiency. Defendant claims that the State presented 
no evidence that the Superior Court of California is a court of 
competent jurisdiction. To the extent that this point reiterates 
defendant's attack on judicial notice in point II, it fails for reasons 
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explained in the State's point II. To the extent defendant's point 
III raises an insufficiency claim, it fails for non-compliance with 
the marshaling requirement. 
4. Inadequately briefed claims. Defendant's claims based on 
insufficiency of evidence, premature charging, California residency, 
and jurisdiction—all raised in his point IV—are inadequately briefed 
and so not properly before this Court. 
4.a. Domestication of foreign custody award. Defendant claims 
that he cannot be prosecuted for custodial interference because his 
visitation rights were governed by a foreign custody award that was 
never domesticated in Utah pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 
and the Utah Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). This claim 
is preserved and adequately briefed. 
It fails, however, because (1) the custodial interference statute 
does not require a domesticated or even a "valid" award, only that 
the award be issued by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) 
conversely, nothing in the Foreign Judgments Act or the UCCJA suggests 
that they were intended to apply in this context;(3) prosecuting 
defendant for custodial interference does not constitute "enforcement" 
of the underlying custody award; (4) defendant's interpretation of 
the Utah statutes runs afoul of the federal Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act; (5) Utah courts have never required domestication 
of a foreign judgment in order to predicate criminal liability upon 
it; and (6) requiring domestication here would lead to absurd results. 
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5. Crossing state lines. Defendant's claim that he should 
not be criminally liable for having removed the child "from one state 
to another" because he is a resident of California was not preserved 
at trial and is not adequately briefed on appeal. It therefore fails. 
6. Double jeopardy. Defendant's double jeopardy claim is 
inadequately briefed. His brief fails to address the pivotal legal 
question and cites no relevant authority. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGE' S UNSWORN COMMENT TO COUNSEL OUTSIDE THE JURY' S 
PRESENCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE "TESTIMONY" 
In point I of his brief, defendant claims that the trial judge 
erred when he "testified" about the courts of the State of California. 
Br. Aplt. at 11. 
Proceedings below. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-303(1) (1995) defines 
custodial interference, as charged in this case, as follows: 
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty 
of custodial interference if, without good cause, the actor 
takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under the 
age of 16 from its parent, guardian, or other lawful 
custodian: 
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; 
and 
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period 
substantially longer than the visitation or custody period 
previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Thus, the State was required to establish at trial that Denim's custody 
award was issued by a "court of competent jurisdiction." Although 
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defendant relied on this very award as justification for his actions 
(see, e.g.. R. 667-68, 823-24, 871), he consistently refused to 
stipulate to an "element of the offense" (R. 799-800). 
At the close of the State's case, the prosecutor asked the court 
to instruct the jury as a matter of law that the Superior Court of 
California is a court of competent jurisdiction (R. 887). The 
prosecutor pointed out that the parties had already stipulated that 
the signing judge was a judge of the Superior Court, that the judge 
issued a Default Judgment establishing custody and visitation, that 
defendant and Linda were named in the pleadings, that the parties 
had testified about the pleadings, and that the trial court had before 
it exemplified copies of the stipulation and judgment entered by 
the California court (R. 892-93) . Defendant argued that "[t]he Court 
has not been supplied with the necessary information to take judicial 
notice" (R. 889). 
The judge stated that, in addition, the structure of the 
California court system was "generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of . . . this Court" (R. 893) . Furthermore, the judge 
had himself practiced law in California for five years before moving 
to Utah and was "well aware of the fact that the California Superior 
Court is analogous to the Utah District Court and . . . is charged 
with handling domestic matters, divorce matters" (R. 894). "And," 
he continued, "I think it's capable of easy determination whether 
the California Superior Court is the court that would handle a domestic* 
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matter in that State" (R. 894) . The court also noted that evidence 
had been admitted that defendant and Linda were living in San 
Bernardino County at the time of the divorce, and that defendant 
had chosen that jurisdiction in which to file his divorce (R. 894) . 
The trial court ruled that the foregoing facts were a sufficient 
basis to take judicial notice that the California Superior Court 
has jurisdiction over divorce proceedings (R. 894; see also R. 270) .4 
Analysis. The linchpin of defendant's argument is that the 
trial judge "testified" by informing counsel of his knowledge of 
the California court system. This "testimony," he argues, violated 
4
 Although the court did not specify this purpose for its 
action, judicially noticing this fact had the effect of keeping 
from the jury evidence of defendant's dishonesty. Requiring the 
State to introduce evidence of the competency of the California 
court would have necessitated introduction of an exemplified copy 
of the Default Judgment (see R. 7 98). 
Defendant's objection to the introduction of this document 
had earlier been sustained (see R. 750-61, 785-86). Defendant's 
motion was based on the fact that the California judgment recited 
the bad faith actions of defendant, including his fraudulent 
transfer of a Cessna airplane, his intentional and deliberate 
disobedience to the orders of the court, his deliberate and 
intentional dissipation of community assets "for the explicit 
purpose of defrauding the community," his removal of numerous 
boats to Arizona "in order to avoid the Jurisdiction of [the 
California] Court," and the sale of assets "in contravention of 
the Court Order and in a direct contradiction of" his prior 
testimony (Exhibit P-l, R. 288-91). As a result of defendant's 
having "acted in a manner of exceedingly bad faith with [the 
California] Court," that court struck his pleadings and entered 
the default judgment (Exhibit P-l, R. 287-88). 
Had the Utah District Court not taken judicial notice of the 
jurisdictional competency of the Superior Court of California, 
this document would have had to be introduced. Thus, the trial 
court's action obviated the need to introduce this arguably 
inflammatory document. 
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rule 605, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: "The judge presiding 
at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection 
need be made in order to preserve the point.'7 See Br. Aplt. at 12. 
The judge's statement was not testimony. It was not made under 
oath nor before the jury (see R. 887) . Defendant cites no authority 
supporting his assumption that a judge's statement to counsel outside 
the presence of the jury is "testimony." See Br. Aplt. at 11-13. 
On the contrary, "testimony" by definition is given "under oath 
or affirmation." Black's Law Dictionary 1476 (6th ed. 1990). Because 
the judge's statement was not "testimony," it did not violate rule 
605 and, consequently, defendant's first point lacks merit. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT' S JUDICIAL NOTICE CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
AND THEREFORE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by judicially noticing 
an element of the offense, to wit, that the custody award here was 
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Br. Aplt. at 13.5 
Rule 24 (a) (9) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that 
the argument portion of appellant's brief "shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
5
 Defendant's brief contains no citation to the record 
showing that this claim was preserved in the trial court or any 
statement of grounds for seeking review of an unpreserved issue. 
See Br. of Aplt- at 2. Consequently, the brief violates rule 
24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The claim was, 
however, arguably preserved below (see R. 889). 
12 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on."' (Emphasis added.) 
Under this rule, Utah appellate courts decline to consider 
arguments that are not adequately supported by authority and analysis. 
See, e.g.. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Farrow, 919 
P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 
1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah App. 1994); State 
v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 
827 P.2d 247, 248-50 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Dav, 815 P.2d 1345, 
1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 613 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Steroer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 514 n.l (Utah App. 1989). 
This Court should decline to consider point II of defendant's 
brief because he has failed to comply with rule 24 (a) (9) . Defendant 
cites no statute, no case, and no rule of evidence. See Br. Aplt. 
at 13-15. The only legal authority he cites is rule 4-504, Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, which requires the submission of 
proposed orders to opposing counsel for approval as to form, a point 
not at issue in this case. See Br. Aplt. at 15. 
Under the authorities cited above, this Court should decline 
to reach defendant's claim that the trial court erroneously took 
13 
judicial notice that the California Superior Court has jurisdiction 
over divorce proceedings (R. 894).6 
POINT III 
THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED AT TRIAL TO PROVE FACTS OF WHICH 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Defendant claims that the evidence of his guilt was insufficient 
because the State "never presented any evidence" that the California 
Superior Court was a court of competent jurisdiction. Br. Aplt. 
at 15-16. 
Of course, the trial court judicially noticed that the California 
court had jurisdiction over domestic matters, thereby obviating the 
need for proof on this point. See State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600, 
601 (Utah 1951) ("Judicial notice is the taking cognizance by the 
court of certain facts without the necessity of proof"). 
To the extent that defendant's point III reiterates his attack 
on the trial court's having taken judicial notice, it fails for reasons 
stated in point II herein (complete lack of supporting authority). 
6
 All evidence introduced at trial supported the court's 
ruling in any event. Defendant's theory that he was entitled to 
six weeks of visitation necessarily assumed the legitimacy of the 
stipulation entered by the California Superior Court (see, e.g., 
R. 871-72). On appeal he continues to argue that his visitation 
was "regular and authorized" and that he was merely "engaged in 
court ordered activities." Br. Aplt. at 16. At trial, no 
evidence or representations of counsel raised the least doubt 
that the California award constituted a custody award "by a court 
of competent jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-303 (1) (b) 
(1990). 
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To the extent that defendant's point III raises an insufficiency 
claim, his one-page discussion of this issue fails to satisfy or 
even to acknowledge his obligation to marshal the evidence in support 
of the jury verdict. "A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
presents the defendant with a heavy burden. He must first marshal 
all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate 
how this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is 
insufficient to support the verdict." State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 
252, 819 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted); accord West Vallev 
Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). 
Even if the trial court had not judicially noticed the 
jurisdiction of the California Superior Court, the record contains 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably have inferred this fact. 
Defendant acknowledges none of this evidence, see Br. Aplt. at 15-16, 
even though his own theory of the case relied on the validity of 
the California custody award. On appeal, defendant continues to 
assert that his conduct "was no violation of the law" because he 
acted "pursuant to that court order." Br. Aplt. at 16. 
Finally, defendant has not complied with the briefing requirements 
of rule 24(a) (9). See authorities cited in point II above. Other 
than quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (presumption of innocence), 
he cites no authority. See Br. Aplt. at 15-16. In addition, 
defendant's point III contains no analysis of the interplay between 
judicial notice and sufficiency that underlies his argument. 
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Based on the authorities cited in point II of this brief, 
defendant's point III fails for inadequate briefing and failure to 
marshal. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, 
PREMATURE CHARGING, AND JURISDICTION ARE INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED 
Point IV of defendant's brief asserts a cluster of related claims 
based on insufficiency of evidence, premature charging, California 
residency, jurisdiction, and the foreign nature of the custody award. 
All but the last, which will be treated separately in point IV-A 
herein, are inadequately briefed on appeal. 
Authorized visitation. Defendant cla ims that the State "use [d] 
the regular and authorized exercise of visitation to meet an element 
of the offense." Br. Aplt. at 16 (capitalization omitted) . He argues 
that when he picked up his son "he was doing so pursuant to the 
stipulation between the parties that was entered into in California." 
Id. 
The issue at trial and under the statute was not whether defendant 
was acting pursuant to a court order. Indeed, one element of the 
crime is that the perpetrator "hold the child for a period 
substantially longer than the visitation or custody period previously 
awarded." § 76-5-303(1)(b). This language presupposes that the 
perpetrator's custody is initially authorized. 
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vacation. (R. at 901)." Br. Aplt. at 19. Defendant's record cite 
is to his own argument below. Given that rearguing favorable evidence 
does not satisfy appellant's burden to marshal, see York v. Shulsen, 
875 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah App. 1994), a fortiori citation to one's 
own argument below does not. 
Other claims. Point IV of defendant's brief may be read to 
assert other claims: that his conviction should be reversed because 
an information and arrest warrant were issued prematurely, see Br. 
Aplt. at 17; that, as a California resident, he cannot be guilty 
of having "removed [Denim] and taken [him] from one state to another," 
section 76-5-303(3) , Br. Aplt. at 18; and that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction because "[t]here was no offense at all especially that 
was committed in the State of Utah." Id. 
Under the authorities cited in point II herein, all such claims 
fail because they are unsupported by any legal authority or analysis. 
See Br. Aplt. at 17-18. "y[A] reviewing court is entitled to have 
the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is 
not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 
130 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted)). 
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POINT IV-A 
A FOREIGN CUSTODY AWARD NEED NOT BE REGISTERED IN THE STATE 
OF UTAH IN ORDER TO SUPPORT A CHARGE OF CUSTODIAL 
INTERFERENCE 
3n th" Id Mi-1 | M11 Li MI i ni • ' "", IIHI iM'nlanl ' s brief argues 
that defendant cannot be guilty : : :erference with custody based 
ci. ii "' "a I i f orni ,"i ,u|,ii nly riw.i rd tridt wds never registered in rM* ,sU 
See Br , Ap 11 ...it 19 - 2 i ," Tins clai™ i ? preserved and adequa;..-.. / 
briefed. 
Defendant reli o c ^n two s . jt**«. I 
Judgment Act. "* •• -^ ?-• ~ T8-22a-I through •- - Br. Apir, -^: 
19 -20 Tin : . ' i 
judgments entered > the cu^rt- * ~:-i states. 1 .e , :^ :r^ .': 
* i <riH 1 j I MI 1 i I • cne aisLiiCi c ; r t 
together witn H affidavit s^a1ir^ • r-:- ^ddress ^€ the 
. , • /ri-^^d-ju,' The cc ;rt clerk mails 
..' . e or filing i in*- ^udgment +"o +-^ udgment debt-. , 
after a JU-UG *?';-<-• ^ r-^iou, t^ .c judgment
 :s "subject to the same 
procedures, aifenses ,-,:: jrcemen4 : I on, ..mid pi. oceedings 
*• * r reopen IPO ^ca i r\ ; ^ •• - r . . - : d-r staying as a judgment 
78-22a 2, -3. 
8
 The State has numbered this claim point IV-A in order to 
devote an entire point to this claim while still somewhat 
tracking defendant's numbering. 
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The other statute on which defendant relies is the Utah Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l 
through -26. The primary purpose of the Act is to "avoid jurisdiction 
competition and conflict with courts of other states in matters of 
child custody." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l(l)(a). The UCCJA 
establishes a procedure for filing foreign custody decrees in a Utah 
district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-15 (1) . Once the parties 
are given notice and an opportunity to be heard, a "custody decree 
so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in like manner 
as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state." Id. However, 
"if the copy has not been filed, it shall not be considered a valid; 
custody decree." Id. 
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992) considered 
these two statutes in a civil custody dispute. The case involved 
an Ohio divorce decree which had been filed in Utah and an Ohio 
modification order which had not. Ici. at 159. Under one order, 
the mother was entitled to custody; under the other, the father was. 
Id. This Court held that "only the original divorce decree was 
enforceable in Utah since only it had been filed here." .Id. at 164. 
Defendant contends that Holm controls the case at bar. See 
Br. Aplt. at 22. Prosecuting him for custodial interference based 
on the California Default Judgment, he argues, constitutes 
"enforcement" of an undomesticated foreign judgment. Id. 
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The trial court rejected this application of a civil precedent 
Jim tin or iiii J n.i I i n i „ -n i , | 7 7 9»!i;v) . I L reasoned that prosecuting 
a violation of the custodial interference statute was unlike 1 a^ing 
jurisdiction n\ d domestic dispute and enforcing or modifying rhe 
provisions of a foreign decree (D . e cour* ; 
t h e c r i m i n a l statute had "specif elements and that those elements. 
do not require any particul ar val i 
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 : rosecut.ui. needed ~^ establish only that the 
OP fa1 t Judgment was awarded * - * competent jurisdiction. 
Cf. State v. Smith, 7 H D , -.. *rp luyiJ) Ipei C U M am)' 
("Our statute requires the accused person t r/f secured temporary 
custody or visitation r I t;c.l puisunnf I o 
a court ordei . 
Secoi - i sel y i" " ln >> • n i in 1 i M I IJII ilndgments Act or' 
the UCCJA suggests that eithex w ^ > intended to apply in the criminal 
context ThiH1"' U-.'Xl ""i 1,,1'ne I dgments Act makes no reference 
to the criminal setting, < :**• ontrary, the Act speaks in civil 
laiqr in, speei .1 y i r\q IV i example tiiac the foreign judgment is to be 
filed by the "judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor" and 
notice served upon the "judgment debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3. 
Similarly, the UCCJA makes no reference to criminal law. One 
stated purpose of the Act is to "deter abductions and other unilateral 
removals of children," but only those "undertaken to obtain custody 
awards." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l(a) (e) . There is no indication 
that the abduction at issue here was undertaken for this purpose. 
These statutes are limited to the civil context and Utah courts 
have never required domestication of foreign judgments in the criminal 
context. Hence, Holm, a civil enforcement action, does not control 
the case at bar (see R. 784-85). 
Third, prosecuting a defendant for custodial interference does 
not constitute "enforcement" of the underlying custody award. 
Defendant cites no authority to the contrary. See Br. Aplt. at 19-23. 
Section 76-5-303(1) (b) provides that a person commits the crime of 
custodial interference if he does certain specified acts "with intent 
to hold the child for a period substantially longer than the visitation 
or custody period previously awarded by a court of competent 
jurisdiction." Thus, the finder of fact looks to the custody award 
to determine the duration of the custody period, but does not "enforce" 
it. Indeed, the filing of a criminal action is not a recognized 
means of enforcing a civil judgment. See generally 30 Am. Jur. 2d 
Executions and Enforcement of Judgments (1994) . 
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Fourth, if, on the other hand, prosecuting defendant for custodial 
interference does constitute enforcement ol: t ne Lai ILOJ in i a iX'fauli. 
Judgment, requiring .its domestication may run afoul of federal law, 
The Parentc-. idnaping Prevention vi j a t-einp'i s i In- I'latH's 
version of the UCCJA if the two conflict. In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 
lurrjhi '-*90) (citat; ions omitted) "I"'hoJ" PK1;,A pi nv ides 
that "[t]he appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce-
.icuii s . . . . 11 i usfiHiy determination made 
consistently wi th the provisions of this section by a court of another 
Stoaf.o " 11 ", L. 1738A(a). The PKPA contains no domestication 
requiremen 
Fifth - .diciajL opinions discussing foreign judgments in the 
criminal context never mention any domestication requireme: r 
example, in State v. Hiaaenbotharr - '•*,;.- ^45, 549 (Utah 1996), 
the State attempted fn prov- . _vj-- . - r. oil parole for 
a prior felony con-, - ot i ,;., -\,, element : • ••- ;-:ime of possession 
^zed 
^ Length the State' pic- -io : . ; r. imately concluded that had 
t-*d to ihf.i. juce <-nJf-qtiate proof of Higgenbotham's Idaho conv^ct^on. 
Id .:-. 54 9-oG. However, the court never intimated tha t domestication 
of the Idaho judgment of conviction w7- required. See id. Accord 
State v. Lamorie, bill t". 2d J< L"1 (Ut.ati 1 • •. * : 
9
 Holm does :ic_ address the PKPA. See 840 P.2d at 160-64. 
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case, proof of defendant's prior Colorado conviction was insufficient; 
however, no mention of domestication requirement); see also In re 
Smith, 925 P.2d 169, 171-73 (Utah 1996) (affirming lawyer' s disbarment-
based on Wisconsin convictions; no mention of domestication 
requirement). 
Finally, this Court should decline defendant's invitation to 
graft the filing requirements of the Foreign Judgments Act and the 
UCCJA onto Utah's criminal custodial interference statute because 
doing so would lead to absurd results. See Millett v. Clark Clinic, 
609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ("interpretations are to be avoided 
which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd"). 
Defendant's interpretation would require parents new to the state 
or visiting here to register foreign custody awards 30 days prior 
to entering Utah in order to claim protection of the custodial 
interference statute. 
The fact pattern of the case at bar also illustrates the mischief 
that defendant's reading of the statutes would create. Defendant 
faults Linda Pace for not domesticating the California Default 
Judgment. See Br. Aplt. at 23. However, in reality, under defendant's 
reading of the statutes, protecting Denim from defendant's acts on 
10 June 1995 was a practical impossibility. 
Under the Foreign Judgments Act, "No execution or other process 
for the enforcement of a foreign judgment filed under this chapter 
may issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed [in a district 
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court of this state] " Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3 10 ^ ^ L^ta^n 
Judgment here VM," en! »-1 I~M1 H M. i y !'• * trie California Superior Court 
|R. 296, 803). Assuming that Linda Pace' s Cal i fornia counsel niai Led 
I -.hat ver> *: • allowing three days for 
mailing, o. - would have received , • ,.
 4 .-:.»r , .. , Assuming further 
that her Uti^ ^  • ^e i;.!e- ^ - '• -> '^strict court the following 
day n? M^ ,udgment wou. 5 
later, :^* " r<=- - *<*. the cay after defendant gav a ii:r:tious 
address an : x 
Thus, defendant effect urges t! •„- ..:t :. . :onstrue these 
fcoaidi interference, 
regardless *: :s a : •: 1.1 < • ; ' -e .. . regardless how vigilant 
^jiuesLicdtiriy tiie California Default Judgment. 
. r.: r> lesui . \ .-,\ required by the terms of the statutes themselv es, 
jjy Utah precedent,
 wr by the equities of this case. 
10
 Under the UCCJA, a foreign decree "shall not be 
considered a valid custody decree" until it is filed in a -.h 
district court and all parties are given an opportunity tc 
contest it, a process that could also consume 30 days ;-. 
See Utah Code Ann § 78 -45c-15. . 
• '
 n
 Beginning the domestication process on 18 .Jnine 1995, au 
defendant now suggests, see Br. Aplt. at 22, would not have cured 
the defect he alleges, since the California Default Judgment 
would not have been a "valid decree" on 10 June 1995, the date on 
which the crime was committed (see R. 90407). 
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POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATUTORY SUBSECTION MAKING 
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE A FELONY IF THE CHILD IS "REMOVED 
AND TAKEN FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER" DOES NOT APPLY TO 
NON-RESIDENTS OF UTAH IS UNPRESERVED AND INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED 
Under section 76-5-303(3)f custodial interference is a class 
A misdemeanor "unless the child is removed and taken from one state 
to another, in which case it is a felony of the third degree.'' It 
is undisputed that defendant took Denim from Utah to California. 
See Br. Aplt. at 24. However, defendant claims that he should not 
have been charged with a felony because his "reason for transporting 
his son out of this state was because he resides in the State of.. 
California." Br. Aplt. at 24. "At the very most," defendant argues, 
he "should have only been charged with a misdemeanor." Id. at 25. 
Charging him with a felony under section 76-5-303(3), he contends, 
constituted a violation of "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution as well as Article I, Sections 7, 24 [sic] 
of the Utah State Constitution." Id. 
A. This claim was not preserved below. 
Defendant's brief contains no citation to the record showing 
that this constitutional claim was preserved in the trial court or 
any statement of grounds for seeking review of an unpreserved issue. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 2. Consequently, the brief violates rule 24 (a) (5), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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trial u ~!\e transporti:^ across the State 1 ,r^ - ^ i ^r never 
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 : 3 
we] 1 established tha* * contemporaneous object •:; * r seme : . m of 
spec. .-,•. ..e 
tria! -j:-. re >. ~d before .a op-I..^.^ • *: • ^ ii: ~~^  ie v -_- claim 
• :: 1 1 a]
 wg -„ -J:„- . _. '93) 
(quoting State v. Johnson, * < * - : . - ; -
B. " inadequately briefed. 
T-. a id it: • * 1 - Cc .* : should jecirx *c consider this issue 
y DiieieQ. 
Defendant cites two castb, Smith m i Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 
p #2d 511 ("Utah 1980) . See Br. AplL. au 23~^.o. Neither is relevant. 
Smith holds that section 'It b ^ ^*n^o+- be ii€*ed to prosecute those 
i^: subject to a custody award. i •- " ^ -r -4i- ;™98. Nielsen involved 
at . - . .. " detention pi ydi 1 at ed un ,.1 i| md 
: -' ' belief ~: ; .:.:,.! -. - .
 i; ^ ;od cause, which he 
. ., . , . ion I'm. modification and receiving 
a temporary restraining order," 620 P.2d at 513, The supreme court 
held t:hal" 1 liese act .ions "v"do not fall within the purview" of section 
76-5-303(1 ) 
Although defendant claims that he is asserting '"the same claim" 
as in Nielsen, see Br. Aplt. a .. ther Nielsen nor Smith mentions 
section 76-5-303 (3) , the U.S. Constitution, the U'tah Constitution, 
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or the distinction between misdemeanor and felony custodial 
interference. In short, neither is relevant to this point. Defendant 
cites no other statute, case, or rule of evidence in support of his 
constitutional claims. See Br. Aplt. at 23-26. 
Although defendant claims that application of section 76-5-303(3) 
to him violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 24 of the Utah 
Constitution, he does not quote or discuss the text of any of these 
provisions or any precedents discussing them. See Br. Aplt. at 23-26. 
Based on the authorities cited in point II of this brief, 
defendant's insufficiency claim fails for inadequate briefing. 
POINT VI 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADDRESS THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
DISMISSAL OF HIS FIRST TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE CONTROLLING 
STATUTE, HIS DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
After defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial, he was tried 
again and convicted. Defendant claims that this retrial violated 
his state and federal double jeopardy rights. See Br. Aplt. at 26.-
Proceedings below. Defendants first trial began on 19 January 
1996 (R. 429) . After the jury was sworn and impaneled, a juror ran 
into defense counsel in the court parking lot and said to him, "What 
are you doing driving a ragtop [convertible] down in country like 
this or weather like this" (R. 544). Defense counsel responded, 
"we can't talk" (R. 545). The juror replied, "Not even a little?" 
or words to that effect, and added, "I like your boots anyhow" (R. 
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545). Defense counsel "informed the Court of the contact so that 
things [could] be dealt with appropt idU11. y"" IIR. '• h.i). 
The State moved for a mistrial,, arguing for the importance of 
"the appearance oi; juislice . . . m l l « . u u i * « -is in o n ini« • rt 
and whatever the outcome the State would not want Ms, tri:s :e 
pub I ii' I MI l)elie\ !•> il Hi I ! h e v e r d n ' l " | usljl based upun n utner 
tn-i * \- -• idence p r e s e n t e d to the court (H. 5 4 b ) . 
I • nisei rpsporn' ' *' " l * * boots were cobra skin, highly 
unusual , with : an--. p a t t e n * - •> • He stated, "I get stopped 
(if! I In- street. lotdi stranger^ . - •- like my boots 
and sometimes i ^ v v.^n4" ^ ^ ^ M ^ . While suelr 
occurrences were sometimes embarrassing ey _-:& v-;;t at all unusual" 
Jefense rouns^, :> 
grounds: first • , :«- * i -v , i- . i:rt > aerated w.*h call -et a: 
-uij defects ir • i evidence *\ -
II: ie :: ou r t: state ::i 11 iat: :1 f t:I: I e s:i tuation were reversed, the 
defendant would have a right to a mistrial under controlling case 
law (R. 553-54) . jt further opined that the State a ] so had a right 
to a fair trial with respect to juror contacts (P 5 >) 
"However, ' the court continued, "before 1 [grant the State's 
m o t i o n ] , n o b o d y 1 i a s !:: a w 1 i a 1: !:  1: I e e f f e c 1: w 1 
be with regard to double jeopardy where jeopardy has attached, Does 
a nybody des 11 *• • d
 :il ian'" m e I n ;j• u 1 e 
now?" (R. 554-55). Defense counsel responded, "I .think we need a 
ruling now, Your Honor" (R. 555). The prosecutor agreed (R. 555) . 
The court granted a mistrial and reduced bail from $100,000 
cash to $15,000 cash or surety (R. 572, 578) .12 Trial was reset for 
8 February 1996 (R. 580-84). 
At the outset of the second trial, defendant moved to dismiss 
on double jeopardy grounds (R. 607). He claimed prejudice in that 
the State had added a witness to its witness list and had obtained 
an exemplified copy of the California divorce judgment (R. 610-11) . 
The court denied defendant's motion in reliance upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-403(4) (c) (iii) (1995) (R. 630, 634). It found that the 
juror's conversation with defense counsel made it "difficult or 
impossible or . . . unadvisable to proceed with the trial because 
there was a substantial danger that the State's right to a fair trial 
would be prejudiced" (R. 632). The court also identified potential 
prejudice to the defendant arising from the fact that defense counsel 
"rebuffed the advance of the juror and basically walked away from 
him" (R. 632). The court ruled although it "didn't use the magic 
[statutory] words ^impossible to proceed'" its "ruling was 
substantially in compliance with [Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-1-
403(4)(c)(iii)]" (R. 632-33). 
Analysis. This issue is inadequately briefed by defendant. 
12
 Defendant was also being held on $5,000 bail pending 
trial on assault by prisoner charges (R. 571). 
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Absent a claim that constitutional guarantees differ from the 
statute, double jeopardy issues in Utah are controlled by Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-403 (1995). See State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 
(UtahApp. 1993). Subsection 76-1-403(1) forbids reprosecution of 
a defendant if the former prosecution was "improperly terminated." 
Termination is improper if it "takes place before the verdict, is 
for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after 
a jury has been impanelled [sic] and sworn to try the defendant," 
subject to certain exceptions. § 76-1-403(4) . One of the exceptions 
is where " [p] rejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not 
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the 
trial without injustice to the defendant or the state." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-403(4)(c)(iii). 
It was on this ground that the trial court denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy (R. 631-34) . Consequently, 
the dispositive question on appeal is whether the juror contact made 
it "impossible to proceed" with defendant's first trial "without 
injustice to the defendant or the state." § 76-1-403(4) (c) (iii). 
Cf. State v. Castle, No. 960755-CA, slip op. at 5-8 (UtahApp. January 
2, 1998). 
However, defendant's brief does not address this question. 
It does not cite the controlling statutory language except insofar 
as the extended excerpt from Nilson incidentally includes it. See 
Br. Aplt. at 27. Defendant claims that Nilson "is precedent in this 
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matter." See Br. Aplt. at 28. However, Nilson addresses subsection 
403(4) (a); it says nothing about subsection 403(4) (c). See Nilson, 
854 P.2d at 1032. It therefore sheds no light on the question before 
this Court. Defendant's brief otherwise cites no authority except 
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. See Br. Aplt. at 
26. Nor does the brief cite any precedents discussing when improper 
juror contact warrants a mistrial. See, e.g.. State v. Pike, 712 
P.2d 277, 279-80 (Utah 1985); State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 757 
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah App. 
1992) ; Loaan Citv v. Carlson, 799 P.2d 224, 225-26 (Utah App. 1990); 
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 908-09 (Utah App. 1990). 
The following sentence constitutes defendant's entire discussion 
of the termination of the first trial: "The prosecution failed to 
inquire the nature of the conversation [sic] or adequately demonstrate 
findings in which this Court could properly rule for a mistrial and 
not attach Double Jeopardy [sic] ." Br. Aplt. at 28. Any implication 
that the nature of the conversation was not adequately explored is 
misleading, since defense counsel himself disclosed the entire 
conversation to the Court (see R. 546). 
Likewise, the claim that the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings is puzzling in light of the following statement by the court: 
"But I certainly made a finding that the State's right to a fair 
trial was in jeopardy because of that contact. And I think that's, 
that is tantamount to the finding required under 76-1-403. I didn't 
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use the magic words ^ impossible to proceed' but I think that my ruling 
was substantially in compliance with that statute" (R. 632-33). 
The court was correct. So long as "the record clearly reflects that 
the mistrial was based on" the requirements of section 7 6-1-
403 (4) (c) (iii), any deficiency in the trial court's findings is 
harmless. See Castle, No. 960755-CA, slip op. at 6. 
In short, defendant's brief contains no authority or analysis 
relevant to the pivotal question of whether defendant's first trial 
was improperly terminated. Accordingly, based on the authorities 
cited in point II of this brief, defendant's double jeopardy claim 
fails for inadequate briefing. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ( Q January 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
r. J FREDERIC VOROS, JR 
assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-5-303. Custodial interference. 
(1) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, 
without good cause, the actor takes, entices, conceals, or detains a child under 
the age of 16 from its parent, guardian, or other lawful custodian: 
(a) knowing the actor has no legal right to do so; and 
(b) with intent to hold the child for a period substantially longer than 
the visitation or custody period previously awarded by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. 
(2) A person, whether a parent or other, is guilty of custodial interference if, 
having actual physical custody of a child under the age of 16 pursuant to a 
judicial award of any court of competent jurisdiction which grants to another 
person visitation or custody rights, and without good cause the actor conceals 
or detains the child with intent to deprive the other person of lawful visitation 
or custody rights. 
(3) Custodial interference is a class A misdemeanor unless the child is 
removed and taken from one state to another, in which case it is a felony of the 
third degree. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-403 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent pros-
ecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have 
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty 
by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence 
to warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt 
that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes 
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the 
jury trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is 
necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity 
with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the 
state that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict revers-
ible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable 
to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, 8 3. 
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78-22-4. Mileage allowance for judgment debtor required 
to appear. 
Every judgment debtor legally required to appear before a circuit or district 
court or a master to answer concerning his, her, or its property is entitled, on 
a sufficient showing of need, to mileage of 15 cents per mile for each mile 
actually and necessarily traveled in going only, to be paid by the judgment 
creditor at whose instance the judgment debtor was required to appear, but 
the judgment creditor is not required to make any payment for such mileage 
until the judgment debtor has actually appeared before the court or master. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 159, { 1. 
CHAPTER 22a 
FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT 
Section 
78-22a-l. 
78-22a-2. 
78-22a-3. 
78-22*4. 
Short title. 
Definition — Filing and status of 
foreign judgments. 
Notice of filing. 
Stay. 
Section 
78-22a-5. 
78-22a-6. 
78-22a-7. 
78-22a-8. 
Lien. 
Optional procedure. 
Fees. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
78-22a-l. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Foreign Judg-
ment Act." 
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-l, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 169, f 1. 
78-22a-2. Definition — Filing and status of foreign judg-
ments. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any judgment, de-
cree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court whose acts 
are entitled to full faith and credit in this state. 
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an ap-
propriate act of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the 
clerk of any district court in Utah. The clerk of the district court shall treat 
the foreign judgment in all respects as a judgment of a district court of Utah. 
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same effect and is 
subject to the same procedures, defenses, enforcement, satisfaction, and pro-
ceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a 
district court of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-2, enacted by L. for "county* in the first sentence in Subsection 
1983, ch. 169, § 1; 1991, ch. 169, § 1. (2), added the Subsection (3) designation, in-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- serted "foreign" before judgment" in Subsec-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted tion (3), and made stylistic changes in Subsec-
"clerk" for "county clerk" and "district court" tions (1) and (3). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
creates a new Utah judgment which is gov-
erned by the Utah statute of limitations. Pan 
Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991). 
Setting aside foreign judgments. 
Neither the Utah Foreign Judgment Act 
(this chapter), nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., per-
mits a court to set aside a foreign default judg-
ment because of alleged inadvertence, mistake, 
or neglect absent a showing of fraud or the lack 
of jurisdiction or due process in the rendering 
state. Data Mgt. Sys. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 
377 (Utah 1985). 
Cited in Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 
(Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXIL — Judgment subject to appeal as en-
titled to full faith and credit, 2 A.L.R.3d 1384. 
78-22a-3, Notice of filing. 
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, at the time of filing a 
foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with the clerk of the district court 
stating the last known post-office address of the judgment debtor and the 
judgment creditor. 
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, the clerk of the 
district court shall notify the judgment debtor that the judgment has been 
filed. Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the affidavit. The clerk shall 
record the date the notice is mailed in the register of actions. The notice shall 
include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor and the 
name and address of the judgment creditor's attorney, if any. 
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of a foreign judgment 
filed under this chapter may issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-3, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 169, § 1; L. 1984, ch. 36, § 1; 1986, 
ch. 172, ft 1. 
78-22a-4- Stay. 
(1) If an appeal from a foreign judgment is pending, the time for appeal has 
not expired, or a stay of execution has been granted, the court, upon proof that 
the judgment debtor has furnished security for satisfaction of the judgment in 
the state in which the judgment was rendered shall stay enforcement of the 
judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or until 
the stay of execution expires or is vacated. 
(2) If the foreign judgment debtor, upon motion, shows the district court 
any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of a district court of this 
state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judg-
ment upon the posting of security in the kind and amount required to stay 
enforcement of a domestic judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
Dormant judgment. 
Limitation of actions. 
Setting aside foreign judgments. 
Cited. 
Dormant judgment 
If a foreign judgment is filed in Utah and 
subsequently becomes dormant in the state of 
rendition, its enforceability in this state is not 
affected. Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142 
(Utah 1991). 
Limitation of actions. 
At least for purposes of enforcement, the fil-
ing of a foreign judgment under Subsection (2) 
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History: C. 1953, 78-22a-4, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 169, § 1. 
78-22a-5, Lien. 
(1) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter becomes a lien as provided 
in Section 78-22-1 if a stay of execution has not been granted. 
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied, the foreign judgment 
becomes a lien upon the judgment debtor's property on the date it is docketed. 
History: C. 1953, 7S-22a-5, enacted by L. 
1983, ctu 169, i 1; L. 1984, ch, 36, i 2; 1986, 
ch. 172, i 2. 
78-22a-6. Optional procedure. 
This chapter shall not be construed to impair a judgment creditor's right to 
bring an action in this state to enforce such creditor's judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-6, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 169, I 1. 
78-22a-7. Fees. 
Fees for docketing, transcription, and other enforcement proceedings with 
respect to foreign judgments shall be as provided in Sections 78-3-16.5,21-2-3, 
and 21-2-4. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-7, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1990, substituted 
1983, ch. 169, 8 1; 1990, ch. 128, fi 12. "78-3-16.5" for "21-2-2." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
78-22a-8. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This chapter shall be construed to effectuate the general purpose to make 
uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: C. 1953, 78-22a-8, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 169, § 1. 
CHAPTER 22b 
UNIFORM FOREIGN-MONEY CLAIMS 
ACT 
Section Section 
78-22b-101. Short title. 78-22b-106. Determining the amount of the 
78-22b-102. Definition*. money of certain contract 
78-22b-103. Scope. claims. 
78-22b-104. Variation by agreement 78-22b-107. Asserting and defending a for-
78-22b-105. Determining the money of the eign-money claim. 
claim. 78-22b-108. Judgments and awards on for-
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Section Section 
Information exchange — Stay 
of proceeding on notice of an 
other proceeding. 78-45c-ltt 
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on find-
ing of inconvenient forum — 
Factors in determination — 78-45c-16. 
Communication with other 
court — Awarding costs. 78-45c-17. 
78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as ba-
sis for refusing jurisdiction— 7S-45c-18. 
Notice to another jurisdiction 
— Ordering petitioner to ap- 78~45c-19. 
pear in other court or to re-
turn child — Awarding costs. 
78-45c-9. Information as to custody of 
child and litigation concern-
ing required in pleadings — 78-45c-20. 
Verification — Continuing 
duty to inform court. 
7$-45c-10. Joinder of persons having cus-
tody or claiming custody or 78-45c-21. 
visitation rights. 
78-45c-l 1. Ordering party to appear — En-
forcement — Out-of-state 78-45c-22. 
party — Travel and other ex-
penses. 78-45c-23. 
78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree 
— Conclusive unless modi- 78-45c-24. 
fied. 78-45C-25. 
78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of 
foreign decrees. 78-45c-26. 
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree 
— Prerequisites — Factors 
considered. 
Filing foreign decree — Effect 
— Enforcement — Award of 
expenses. 
Registry maintained by clerk of 
court — Documents entered. 
Certified copies of decrees fur-
nished by clerk of court. 
Taking testimony of persons in 
other states. 
Request to court of another 
state to take evidence, to 
make studies or to order ap-
pearance of party — Payment 
of costs. 
Taking evidence for use in court 
of another state — Ordering 
appearance in another state 
— Costs — Enforcement. 
Preservation of records of pro-
ceedings — Furnishing copies 
to other state courts. 
Requesting court records from 
another state. 
Foreign countries — Applica-
tion of general policies. 
Priority on court calendar. 
Notices — Orders to appear — 
Manner of service. 
Short title. 
78-45c-l. Purposes — Construction. 
(1) The general purposes of this act are to: 
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other 
states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the 
shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-
being; 
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a 
custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in 
the interest of the child; 
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place 
ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the 
closest connection and where significant evidence concerning his care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, 
and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the 
child and his family have a closer connection with another state; 
(d) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the inter-
est of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relation-
ships for the child; 
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children under-
taken to obtain custody awards; 
(f) avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state 
insofar as feasible; 
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(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states; 
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of 
mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other 
states concerned with the same child; and 
(i) to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in 
this section. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, t 1. act," as used in this section, means Laws 1980, 
Meaning of "this act9* — The term "this ch. 41, which enacted this chapter. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and appli- Rights and obligations resulting from 
cation of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction human artificial insemination, 83 AX.R4th 
Act, 96 A.LJl3d 968. 295. 
Kidnapping or related offense by taking or chM custody: when does state that issued 
removing of child by or under authority of par-
 preyiouB custody determination have continu-
A£^!F£!3^ HiSSSk ^ Jurisdiction under Uniform Child Custody JvP VZ ** * ^ ^ i g ^ ^ n p a r e n t Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or Parental Kidnap-child custody cases, 45 A.L.R.4th 212. •wwuwwu n u v u ^ i v ^ m u w iuuwqr 
State court's authority, in marital or child P in* Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS 
custody proceeding, to allocate federal income * 1738A, 83 A.LJUth 742. 
tax dependency exemption for child to noncus- Parental rights of man who is not biological 
todial parent under § 152(e) of the Internal or adoptive father of child but was husband or 
Revenue Code (26 USCS S 152(e)), 77 cohabitant of mother when child was conceived 
A.L.R.4th 786. or born, 84 AXJUth 655. 
Applicability of Uniform Child Custody Ju- Child custody and visitation rights of person 
risdiction Act (UCCJA) to temporary custody infected with AIDS, 86 AJLIUth 211. 
orders, 81 A.L.R.4th 1101. 
78-45c-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a 
right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a child; 
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision and court orders 
and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation 
rights; it does not include a decision relating to child support or any other 
monetary obligation of any person; 
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a custody de-
termination is one of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of 
marriage, or legal separation, and includes child neglect and dependency 
proceedings; 
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determination con-
tained in a judicial decree or order made in a custody proceeding, and 
includes an initial decree and a modification decree; 
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the child immediately pre-
ceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person 
acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a 
child less than six months old the state in which the child lived from birth 
with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of 
the named persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning a particu-
lar child; 
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(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which modifies or 
replaces a prior decree, whether made by the court which rendered the 
prior decree or by another court; 
(8) "Physical custody7 means actual possession and control of a child; 
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other than a parent, who 
has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody 
by the court or claims a right to custody; and 
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United 
States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 2. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJL — What types of proceedings or de- Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
terminations are governed by the Uniform 78 A.L.R4th 1028. 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the 
78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state. 
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters 
has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modifica-
tion decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the following paragraphs are 
met: 
(a) this state: 
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of 
the proceeding; or 
(ii) had been the child's home state within six months before com-
mencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state 
because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody 
or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent con-
tinues to live in this state; 
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume 
jurisdiction because: 
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contes-
tant, have a significant connection with this state; and 
(ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning 
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
(c) the child is physically present in this state or this state is the most 
recent domicile of the mother prior to the birth of the child, and: 
(i) the child has been abandoned; or 
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he 
has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is 
otherwise neglected or dependent; or 
(d) (i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under 
prerequisites substantially in accordance with Subsection (l)(a), (b), 
or (c), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the 
custody of the child; and 
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(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume 
jurisdiction. 
(2) Except under Subsections (l)(c) and (d), physical presence in this state 
of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child custody determina-
tion. 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for 
jurisdiction to determine his custody. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 3; 1990, ch- 143, 
§ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added "or this 
state is the most recent domicile of the mother 
prior to the birth of the child," at the end of the 
introductory paragraph in Subsection (lXc) 
and made stylistic changes and changes in 
punctuation throughout 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appropriate forum. 
Emergency jurisdiction. 
—Permanent custody. 
Appropriate forum. 
Utah district court appropriately retained ju-
risdiction under the Utah Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act to make any determina-
tions regarding custody, visitation or other 
matters relevant to the children, where the 
parents were divorced in Utah and, although 
the mother had taken the children to Washing-
ton, that state specifically declined to exercise 
jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present 
involvement with the matter. Rawlings v. 
Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
This chapter does not give a preference to 
the "home state." The significant connection or 
substantial connection basis comes into play 
either when the home state test cannot be met 
or as an alternative to that test. In re W.D. v. 
Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah C t App.), cert 
denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
Even though a certain state may be the 
"home state," if the child and his family have 
equal or stronger ties with another state that 
other state also has jurisdiction. In re W D . v. 
Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert 
denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
Judge did not abuse his discretion in decid-
ing that California was the more appropriate 
and convenient forum to litigate custody and in 
granting the state's motion to dismiss the nat-
ural parents' petition, where substantial infor-
mation concerning the parents' abilities and 
past history was in California, the mother had 
only recently come to Utah but had lived for 
years in California, and the parents' purpose in 
coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In 
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct 
App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
Emergency jurisdiction. 
Emergency jurisdiction under Subsection 
(l)(c) is reserved for extraordinary circum-
stances. Emergency jurisdiction should be lim-
ited to those cases of neglect where the harm is 
immediate or imminent. In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 
118 (Utah C t App. 1990). 
—Permanent custody. 
An assumption of emergency jurisdiction is 
an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only; 
it does not confer upon the state the authority 
to make a permanent custody disposition. In re 
DJS.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah C t App. 1990). 
78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and heard. 
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice and opportunity to 
be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights 
have not been previously terminated, and any person who has physical cus-
tody of the child. If any of these persons is outside this state, notice and 
opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to Section 78-45c-5. 
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History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act'* — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to i 78-45c-l. 
78-45c-5. , Service of notice outside state — Proof of svv\ ice 
— Submission to jurisdiction. 
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this 
state shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, 
and may be made in any of the following ways: 
(a) by personal delivery outside this state in the manner prescribed for 
service of process within this state; 
(b) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the 
service is made for service of process in that place in an action in any of 
its courts of general jurisdiction; 
(c) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and re-
questing a receipt; or 
(d) as directed by the court (including publication, if other means of 
notification are ineffective). 
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, delivered, or last pub-
lished at least 10 days before any hearing in this state. 
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the indi-
vidual who made the service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of this 
state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place 
in which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt 
signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee. 
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, { 5. 
Cross-References. — Service of process, 
Rule 4, U.R.C.P. 
78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere — Jurisdiction 
not exercised — Inquiry to other state — Infor-
mation exchange — Stay of proceeding on notice 
of another proceeding. 
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at 
the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child 
was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in 
conformity with this act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the 
other state because this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons. 
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall ex-
amine the pleadings and other information supplied by the parties under 
Section 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody registry established 
under Section 78-45c-16 concerning the pendency of proceedings with respect 
to the child in other states. If the court has reason to believe that proceedings 
may be pending in another state it shall direct an inquiry to the state court 
administrator or other appropriate official of the other state. 
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a pro-
ceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state 
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before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and com-
municate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end 
that the issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that infor-
mation be exchanged in accordance with Sections 78-45c-19 through 
78-45c-22. If a court of this state has made a custody decree before being 
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immedi-
ately inform that court of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding 
was commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise 
inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more 
appropriate forum. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, | 6. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to 8 78-45c-l. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS sues could be litigated in the more appropriate 
forum, where the child resided in Oregon at 
Pending foreign proceeding. the time and the Oregon court had appointed 
—Stay of Utah action. the child's grandparents as guardians. Cop-
Proceedings elsewhere. pedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985). 
Pending foreign proceeding. Proceedings elsewhere. 
Where grandparents in Oregon, with whom 
—Stay of Utah action. child was visiting, had won custody in Oregon 
Utah district court, after learning of prior court, Utah district court was required to stay 
guardianship proceedings in Oregon, was re- parents' proceeding seeking custody determi-
quired to stay a Utah action seeking to deter- nation and to communicate with Oregon court 
mine child custody and to communicate with to determine the propriety of further proceed-
the* Oregon court to determine the propriety of ings in Oregon. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 
further proceedings in Oregon, so that the is- 1121 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or de- Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
terminations are governed by the Uniform 78 A.L.R4th 1028. 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the 
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient 
forum — Factors in determination — Communi-
cation with other court — Awarding costs. 
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or 
modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before 
making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody 
determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another 
state is a more appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own 
motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representa-
tive of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if 
it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this 
purpose it may take into account the following factors, among others: 
(a) if another state is or recently was the child's home state; 
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(b) if another state has a closer connection with the child and his fam-
ily or with the child and one or more of the contestants; 
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available 
in another state; 
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appro-
priate; and 
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contra-
vene any of the purposes stated in Section 78-45c-l. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court 
may communicate with a court of another state and exchange information 
pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to 
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and 
that a forum will be available to the parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of 
another state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or 
it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be 
promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions 
which may be just and proper, including the condition that a moving party 
stipulate his consent and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum. 
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a 
custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another pro-
ceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding. 
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may 
require the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the 
costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other expenses, 
including attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Pay-
ment is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall 
inform the court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the 
court which would have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, 
shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate 
official for forwarding to the appropriate court. 
(9) Any communication received from another state informing this state of 
a finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this state is the more 
appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate 
court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the 
original court of this fact. 
History: L. 1080, ch. 41, ft 7. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ing that California was the more appropriate 
and convenient forum to litigate custody and in 
Appropriate forum elsewhere. granting the state's motion to dismiss the nat-
Communicationiwith other court ^ parents' petition, where substantial infor-
^tAd t t e n TecOTdm mation concerning the parents' abilities and 
Clte<1
* past history was in California, the mother had 
Appropriate forum elsewhere. only recently come to Utah but had lived for 
Judge did not abuse his discretion in decid- years in California, and the parents' purpose in 
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coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In their conclusions and the basis for any agree-
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. ment should be set forth clearly in the record. 
App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct App. 
Communication with other court 1990)* 
—Written record. C i t e d m T**11* v- ?****>735 P 2 d 3*2 (Utah 
When judges communicate by telephone, 1987); Rawlings v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 
they should make a prompt written record of (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing ju-
risdiction — Notice to another jurisdiction — Or-
dering petitioner to appear in other court or to 
return child — Awarding costs. 
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child 
from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court 
may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of adjudication of custody if 
this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise 
its jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, 
without consent of the person entitled to custody has improperly removed the 
child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has im-
properly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of 
physical custody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a cus-
tody decree of another state the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if 
this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an 
initial custody decree pursuant to Subsection (1), the court shall notify the 
parent or other appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney of the appro-
priate jurisdiction in the other state. If a request to that effect is received from 
the other state, the court shall order the petitioner to appear with the child in 
a custody proceeding instituted in the other state in accordance with Section 
78-45c-20. If no such request is made within a reasonable time after such 
notification, the court may entertain a petition to determine custody by the 
petitioner if it has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-2 [78-45c-3]. 
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction to modify the custody 
decree of another state pursuant to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section 
78-45c-14, the court shall notify the person who has legal custody under the 
decree of the other state and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate 
jurisdiction in the other state and may order the petitioner to return the child 
to the person who has legal custody. If it appears that the order will be 
ineffective and the legal custodian is ready to receive the child within a period 
of a few days, the court may place the child in a foster care home for such 
period, pending return of the child to the legal custodian. At the same time, 
the court shall advise the petitioner that any petition for modification of 
custody must be directed to the appropriate court of the other state which has 
continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines jurisdiction, to 
a court in a state which has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-45c-3. 
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section 
may charge the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including 
attorney's fees and the cost of returning the child to another state. 
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History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of residence the proper venue for the action 
since the children's presence was the result of 
Misconduct of petitioner. the father's wrongful refusal to return the chil-
Cited._ dren to their mother, who had custody under 
M j -A * x**i t*16 decree, after a visitation period. Angell v. 
MUconduct of^petitioner. Sixth Judicial Dist Court, 656 P.2d 405 (Utah 
Fact that children were present in county of 1982). 
residence of father who brought action to mod-
ify the child custody provisions of a foreign di- Cited in Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P*2d 
vorce decree did not make the father's county 1121 (Utah 1985). 
78-45c-9- Information as to custody of child and litigation 
concerning required in pleadings — Verification 
— Continuing duty to inform court 
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading or in an affida-
vit attached to that pleading shall give information under oath as to the 
child's present address, the places where the child has lived within the last 
five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the 
child has lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavit every party 
shall further declare under oath as to each of the following whether: 
(a) he has participated, as a party, witness, or in any other capacity, in 
any other litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or 
any other state; 
(b) he has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child 
pending in a court of this or any other state; and 
(c) he knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who has 
physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights 
with respect to the child. 
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in the affirmative the 
declarant shall give additional information under oath as required by the 
court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the 
information furnished and as to other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdic-
tion and the disposition of the case. 
(3) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody 
proceeding concerning the child in this or any other state of which he obtained 
information during this proceeding. 
History: L. 1980, rh 41, § 9. 
78-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or claiming 
custody or visitation rights. 
If the court learns from information furnished by the parties pursuant to 
Section 78-45c-9 or from other sources that a person not a party to the custody 
proceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody or 
visitation rights with respect to the child, it shall order that person to be 
joined as a party and to be duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and 
of his joinder as a party. If the person joined as a party is outside this state he 
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shall be served with process or otherwise notified in accordance with Section 
78-45c-5. 
History: L. 1980v ch. 41, I 10. 
78-45c-ll. Ordering party to appear — Enforcement — 
Out-of-state party — Travel and other expenses. 
(1) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in this state to 
appear personally before the court. If that party has physical custody of the 
child the court may order that he appear personally with the child. If the 
party who is ordered to appear with the child cannot be served or fails to obey 
the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a 
warrant of arrest against such party to secure his appearance with the child. 
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is 
outside this state with or without the child the court may order that the notice 
given under Section 78-45c-5 include a statement directing that party to ap-
pear personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear 
may result in a decision adverse to that party. 
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appear 
under Subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before the court with or 
without the child, the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of 
the court travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of 
the child if this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
History; L. 1980, eh. 41, | 11. 
78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree — Conclusive 
unless modified. 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction 
under Section 78-45c-3, binds all parties who have been served in this state or 
notified in accordance with Section 78-45c-5 or who have submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. 
As to these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and 
fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless and until that 
determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this 
act. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 12. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to 5 78-45c*L 
AXJL — Liability of legal or natural par-
ent, or one who aids and abets, for damages 
resulting from abduction of own child, 49 
AXJUth7. 
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78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign de-
crees. 
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification 
decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statu-
tory provisions substantially in accordance with this act or which was made 
under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so 
long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional 
standards substantially similar to those of this act. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, 5 13. 
Meaning of 'Hhia act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJJS. — 50 C J.S. Judgments S 889. 
78-45c-l I Modification of foreign decree Prerequisites 
— Factors considered. 
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this 
state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this 
state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction 
under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or 
has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of 
this state has jurisdiction. 
(2) If a court of this state is authorized under Subsection (1) and Section 
78-45c-8 to modify a custody decree of another state it shall give due consider-
ation to the transcript of the record and other documents of all previous pro-
ceedings submitted to it in accordance with Section 78-45c-22. 
History: L. 1380, ch. 41, t 14. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 7 8-4 5c-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ther proceedings in Oregon. Coppedge v. Har-
ding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985). 
Communication with foreign court. L ^
 o f jurisdiction. 
Lack of jurisdiction. A juvenile court lacked jurisdiction under ei-
Cited. ther this chapter or the federal Parental Kid-
„ . ., ..»
 m , , napping Prevention Act of 1980 to modify per-
Communication with foreign court manently a Florida custody decree by award-
Where Oregon court had already adjudicated ^ custody to the father, it improperly granted 
custody issue and it appeared that Oregon's ez- temporary custody to the father, after the 
ercise of jurisdiction was proper, Utah district mother had brought the children to Utah while 
court was required to stay proceeding seeking divorce proceedings were pending in Florida. 
custody determination and Oregon decree was In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 
not subject to modification until Utah court 1990). 
had communicated with Oregon court under Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah 
§ 78-45c-6(3) to determine the propriety of fur- Ct App. 1988). 
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78-45c-15. Filing foreign decree — Effect — Enforcement 
— Award of expenses. 
(1) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed in the 
office of the clerk of any district court of this state. The clerk shall treat the 
decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the district court of this 
state. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in 
like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this state. 
(2) A person violating a custody decree of another state which makes it 
necessary to enforce the decree in this state may be required to pay necessary 
travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the party 
entitled to the custody or his witnesses. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 15. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Attorneys' fee awards in parent-
nonparent child custody case, 45 A.L.R.4th 
212. 
78-45c-16. Registry maintained by clerk of court — Docu-
ments entered. 
The clerk of each district court shall maintain a registry in which he shall 
enter all of the following: 
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing; 
(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other 
states; 
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a 
court of another state; and 
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody proceed-
ings in another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this 
state or the disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, f 16. 
78-45c-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished by clerk 
of court. 
The clerk of a district court of this state, at the request of the court of 
another state or at the request of any person who is affected by or has a 
legitimate interest in a custody decree, shall certify and forward a copy of the 
decree to that court or person. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, t 17. 
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78-45c-18. Taking testimony of persons in other states. 
In addition to other procedural devices available to a party, any party to the 
proceeding or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child may 
adduce testimony of witnesses, including parties and the child, by deposition 
or otherwise, in another state. The court on its own motion may direct that the 
testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner 
in which and the terms upon which the testimony shall be taken. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, S 18. 
78-45c-19. Request to court of another state to take evi-
dence, to make studies or to order appearance of 
party — Payment of costs. 
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state 
to hold a hearing to adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give 
evidence under other procedures of that state, or to have social studies made 
with respect to the custody of a child involved in proceedings pending in the 
court of this state; and to forward to the court of this state certified copies of 
the transcript of the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise adduced, or 
any social studies prepared in compliance with the request. The cost of the 
services may be assessed against the parties. 
(2) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state 
to order a party to custody proceedings pending in the court of this state to 
appear in the proceedings, and if that party has physical custody of the child, 
to appear with the child. The request may state that travel and other neces-
sary expenses of the party and of the child whose appearance is desired will be 
assessed against another party or will otherwise be paid. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 19. 
78-45c-20. Taking evidence for use in court of another 
state — Ordering appearance in another state — 
Costs — Enforcement 
(1) Upon request of the court of another state the courts of this state which 
are competent to hear custody matters may order a person in this state to 
appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or to produce or give evidence under 
other procedures available in this state. A certified copy of the transcript of 
the record of the hearing or the evidence otherwise adduced shall be for-
warded by the clerk of the court to the requesting court. 
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give his testimony or state-
ment in this state for use in a custody proceeding outside this state. 
(3) Upon request of the court of another state a competent court of this state 
may order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a custody 
proceeding in another state. The court may condition compliance with the 
request upon assurance by the other state that travel and other necessary 
expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has physical 
custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it appears 
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the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest against 
such person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state. 
History: L. 1980, ch* 41, I 20. 
78-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceedings — Fur-
nishing copies to other state courts. 
In any custody proceeding in this state the court shall preserve the plead-
ings, orders and decrees, any record that has been made of its hearings, social 
studies, and other pertinent documents until the child reaches 18 years of age. 
Upon appropriate request of the court of another state the court shall forward 
to the other court certified copies of any or all of such documents. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 21. 
78-45c-22. Requesting court records from another state. 
If a custody decree has been rendered in another state concerning a child 
involved in a custody proceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of 
this state upon taking jurisdiction of the case shall request of the court of the 
other state a certified copy of the transcript of any court record and other 
documents mentioned in Section 78-45c-21. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 22. 
78-45c-23. Foreign countries — Application of general pol-
icies. 
The general policies of this act extend to the international area. The provi-
sions of this act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees 
of other states apply to custody decrees and decrees involving legal institu-
tions similar in nature to custody rendered by appropriate authorities of other 
nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all 
affected persons. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, 5 23. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-45c-l. 
78-45c-24. Priority on court calendar. 
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which raises a question 
of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this act the case shall be given 
calendar priority and handled expeditiously. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, ! 24. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to I 78-45c-L 
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78-45c-25. Notices — Orders to appear — Manner of ser-
vice. 
(1) Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty upon the court to notify a 
party or court of a particular fact or action, such notification may be accom-
plished by the clerk of the court or a party to the action upon order of the 
court. 
(2) Orders of the court for parties or persons to appear before the court in 
accordance with the terms of this act shall include legal and sufficient service 
of process in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless other-
wise ordered for good cause shown. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, i 25. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l. 
78-45c-26. Short title. 
This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act." 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, I 26. Uniform Laws. — All of the states and the 
Meaning of 'Hhis act" — See note follow- District of Columbia have enacted the Uniform 
ing same catchline in notes to S 78-45c-l. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d §§ 33 to 41. 
CHAPTER 45d 
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION 
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 1, ( 407.) 
78-45d-l to 78-45d-13. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407 repeals and 3 to 10, relating to child support collection, 
§§ 78-45d-l to 78-45d-13, as enacted by Laws effective January 19,1988. For present compa-
1985, ch. 11, § 2 and Laws 1987, ch. 89, § 2, rable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-401 to 
and as last amended by Laws 1987, ch. 89, §§ 1 62A-11-414. 
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SCOTT M. BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) AMENDED INFORMATION 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
ROBERT FRIIS, ) Criminal No. 951500586 
d.o.b. 11/23/49, 
) Judge J. Philip Eves 
Defendant. 
The undersigned complainant, Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, states on information 
and belief that the above-named Defendant, ROBERT FRIIS, committed the following crime, to wit: 
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE, a Third-Degree, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 303, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, in that on or about June 10, 1995, and until on or about 
August 20,1995, in Iron County, State of Utah, the said Robert Friis 
did take, entice, conceal, or detain a child or children under the age of 
16 from its parent, guardian, or lawful custodian knowing the actor 
has no legal right to do so; and with the intent to hold the child for a 
period substantially longer that the visitation or custody period 
previously awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction; and the child 
or children were removed and taken from one state to another. 
This Information is based on evidence provided by Chief Wayne Townsend and Officer 
5th Judicial District C*itf - far *>, <-?, 
F I L E £• 
JAN 1 81996 
^ v^ I/: •-. TV 
0J7? 
Preston Griffiths of the Parowan Police Department and Lee and Linda Pace. 
DATED this 0* day of January, 1996. 
SCOTT M BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
2 
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NAME AND ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY: TELEPHONE NO.: OR COURT USE ONLY 
ALAN CARLISLE, ESQ (909) 944-8880 
10601 CIVIC CENTER DR STE 200 
RANCHO CUCAMONGA CA 91730-380M 
ATTORNEY FOR: ROBERT FRIIS 
Insert name of court, judicial district or branch court, if any, and Post Office and Street Address: 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
8307 HAVEN AVE. 
RANCHO CUCAMONGA CA 91730 
PLAINTIFF: ROBERT E FRIIS 
DEFENDANT: 
LINDA M FRIIS 
EXEMPLIFICATION OF RECORD Case Number: RFL Q1W 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ss. 
I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify and attest that the attached, consisting of 
1 page(s), is a full, true, and correct copy of the original STIPULATION RE CUSTODY AND 
VISITATION AND ORDER THEREON 
on file in my office, and that I have fully compared the s 
n«t»rf JANUARY 23 , 1996 
(SEAL) 
, Deputy Clerk 
(SEAL) 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO j 
I, the undersigned, Judge of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify that SHARON SORRELS 
\s the deputy clerk of the above-entitled court, which is a court of mrnrrl having a nnnlj thqtthc seal affixed thereto 
is the seal of said court; that the said clerk is the legal cusjjjiJimi uf tjjg i^rtgTnal record(s) or docthrient(s) described and 
referred to in the foregoing certificate and attestatiopr^nd that supKcertifftate and attestations if) due fojvn according 
to the laws of the State of California. 
Dated JANUARY 2 3 , 1996 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ss. 
I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, which is a court of record having a seal, which seal is affixed 
hereto, do hereby certify that JOSEPH E JOHNSTON
 t whose name is subscribed to the foregoing 
certificate was, at the time of signing the same, Judge of the above-entitled court, and was duly commissioned, 
qualified, and authorized by law to execute said certifica*er>and that the signature to the foregoing certificate is the 
genuine signature of the judge above-named. ( \jf
 r I J r c /I / 
03C1 
., Deputy Clerk 
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Al / i l ! CARLISLE, ESQ. 
10601 C i v i c Cantor D r . , S u i t e 200 
Raneho CUcamongn, CA 91730-3804 
(909) 944 -8880 
Attorney f o r ROBERT E. FRIIS 
FILED-West District 
StnfcmtrtfiooCfWtvC** 
FEB09»4 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAM FORI! 1A 
COUIITY OF SAIf BF.RHARDIHO 
In re Marriage of 
Petitioner: ROBERT E. FRTIS 
and 
Respondent: LtllDA H. FRTIS 
) CASE HOtRFL 01 •54 1 
) 
) STirUJATJOtl RE 
) CUSTODY AllD 
) VISITATION AllD 
) ORDER 11IEREUII 
) 
THE PARTIES TO THE WTTHIH ACTION, THROUGH THEIR 
RESPECTIVE COUHSEL. HEREBY STIPUJATE THE COURT MAKE THE FOLLOWIHG 
ORDERS: 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. Legal custody of the minor child of the parties, 
19| ROBERT DEMIM FRIIS, born 12/13/93, is awarded jointly to the 
parties. Mutual consent of both parties shall be required for the 
major decisions relating to the child's health, education and 
welfare. Failure to obtain consent may result in contempt action, 
jail sentence, or change or loss of custody. 
Primary physical custody for the care, custody and 
control of minor child to be with Respondent: however. Petitioner 
shall have physical care, custody and control of the minor child as 
Marriage of FRIIS 
ROBERT E. & MHOA M. 
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ll followsj 
7 1 $f*x*Ft*w)«*tra*4w 
41 r. Each month from the second Saturday at 8:00 AH to the 
51 third Sunday at 6i00 PM commencing February, 1994. 
61 b . Christmas 1994, the entire Christmas school vacation, 
7 J commencing 6J00 PH the last day of school before the vacation and 
81 ending 6:00 PH the day before school resumes, and thereafter on 
91 alternate years. 
101 c. Thanksgiving vacation 1995, from 4:00 PM the day 
ill before said vacation to 6:00 PM the day before school resumes and 
12i thereafter on alternate years. 
13| d. Summer vacation - 1994. An extra week in June, July 
141 and August, which will be contiguous with regular custody period. 
151 The decision as to whether it will be prior to or after regular 
16| custody period to be determined by the parties. 
171 Summer vacation - commencing 1995. The first six 
181 (6) weeks of school vacation commencing 6:00 PM the last day before 
191 the vacation and ending at 6:00 PM on Sunday six weeks later. 
20| During said vacation period, at the end of three weeks, Respondent 
2l| will have visitation from Friday at 4:00 PM until Sunday at 6:00 
221 PM. 
231 During the second six weeks of school vacation, while 
241 custody is with Respondent, Petitioner will have weekend visitation 
251 from Friday at 4:00 PM until Sunday at 6:00 PH, during the mid-
26 I point of said period. 
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rick-tip and delivery will be ah Hie folic* ntftt.iott In 
r>rowan, Utah, with * 5! hour Trace period. ** either party 
anticipates a delay beyond that "window" they are required, as eoon 
an U practical, to advise the Watch Commander at rarowan Police 
Department of eald delay and revised estimated time of arrival. 
neither parent is to use disparaging remarks, nor 
allow any other pereon to use dlaparaqlng remarks, about tho oth«»t 
parent in front of th*» child. 
neither parent in to use corporal puiitrtlimetit on tho 
minor child. 
Each parent should promote and encourage mutual 
reopect and affection for the other parent. The child should be 
led to believe that It ir. appropriate for him to love and to value 
both mother and fathot. 
Approved as to form ahd content. 
Da ted i 2^9-74-
Dated! X-+ - t H 
Dated! ZzxZHl 
JT IS SO ORDERBO. 
Dated t ^Lffej&f 
FRT.IS.3 
ALMTcAftbtSLB 
JVfctorney fnr Pat i t loner 
V 
RICHARD 9M0LIII 
At^wheu) for Respondent heu for R 
MICUARt. DARL1II6T0II 
Attorney for Minor child 
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Addendum D 
NAME AND ADDRESS OF ATTORNEY: 
RICHARD SMOLIN, ESQ 
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD SMOLIN 
1076 BROCKTON AVE 
RIVERSIDE, CA 92501 
ATTORNEY FOR: 
(909) 
TELEPHONE NO. 
928-1902 
Insert name of court, judicial district or branch court, if any, and Post Office and Street Address: 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
8307 HAVEN AVE. 
RANCHO CUCAMONGA CA 91730 
.•OR COURT USE ONLY 
PLAINTIFF: 
ROBERT FRIIS 
DEFENDANT: 
LINDA FRIIS 
EXEMPLIFICATION OF RECORD Case Number: RFL 01543 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ss. 
I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify and attest that the attached, consisting of 
16 page(s), is a full, true, and correct copy of the original JUDGMENT 
on file in my office, and that I have fully compared the saprm^ wytythe originaKs 
Dated JANUARY 23, 1996 
(SEAL) 
, Deputy Clerk 
(SEAL) 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ss. 
I, the undersigned, Judge of the above-entitled Court, do hereby certify that SHARON SORRELS 
is the deputy clerk of the above-entitled court, which is a court of record having a seal; that the seal affixed thereto 
is the seal of said court; that the said clerk is the legal nmndjan sf th^nrjoinrrfTfcordblttr^documentte) described and 
referred to in the foregoing certificate and attestation; amfthat such certrocate and atte^ltftiqn is in due form according 
to the laws of the State of California. 
pa t f td JANUARY 2 3 , 1996 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ss. 
I, the undersigned, Deputy Clerk of the above-entitled Court, which is a court of record having a seal, which seal is affixed 
hereto, do hereby certify that JOSEPH E JOHNSTON , whose name is subscribed to the foregoing 
certificate was, at the time of signing the same, Judge of the above-entitled court, and was duly commissioned, 
qualified, and authorized by law to execute said certificate^ and that the sigpatyrejto the foregoing certificate is the 
genuine signature of the judge above-named. 
02S7 
., Deputy Clerk 
LhjnJ 
k%TQRNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Nsme tnc Ac&t 
RICHARD SMOLIN, Esq. 
Law Offices of Richard Smolin 
4076 Brockton Ave 
Riverside, CA 92501 
ATTORNEY FOR (N*me)~ P e t i t i o n e r 
TfcLfcHHUNfc n u : 
( 9 0 9 ) 9 2 8 - 1 9 0 2 
£ SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San B e r n a r d i n o 
STREET ADDRESS: 4 1 6 4 B r o c k t o n Ave 
MAILING ADDRESS: P « 0 * B O X 4 3 1 
CITYANOZIPCODE- R i v e r s i d e , CA 9 2 5 0 1 
BRANCH NAME F a m i l y Lav Annex 0 
MARRIAGE O F 
PETITIONER: ROBERT FRIIS 
RESPONDENT: LINDA FRIIS 
rwn bvwni I M C wnki 
**£?>•* 
MAY « °ntyc,e"-
JUDGMENT 
IX I Dissolution I I Legal separation I I Nullity 
L_J Status only y . y 
L_J Reserving jurisdiction over termination of marital status 8 
Date marital status ends: UPON SIGNATURE OF THE JUDGE 
199$ 
CASE NUMBER: 
RFL 0 1 5 4 3 
This proceeding was heard as follows: 1 X 1 default or uncontested I 1 by declaration under Civil Code. § 4511 I I contested 
a. Date: 1 0 / 1 2 / 9 4 1 3 / * ^ * Dept: 1 1 Rm.: 
> b. Judge (name): DENNIS COLE L - J Temporary judge 
• c. I X I Petitioner present in court I I Attorney present in court (name): I N PRO-PER 
•
 d
- L2L1 Respondent present in court L.XJ Attorney present in court (name): RICHARD SMOLIN, E s q . 
e. 1 I Claimant present in court (name): I I Attorney present in court (name): 
Z The court acquired jurisdiction of the respondent on (date): 8 / 1 8 / 9 3 
1 X I Respondent was served with process I X I Respondent appeared 
3. THE COURT ORDERS, GOOD CAUSE APPEARING: 
a. I X I Judgment of dissolution be entered. Marital status is terminated and the parties are restored to the status of unmarried persons 
W I X 1 on the following date (specify): 
^mmm^ (2) I I on a date to be determined on noticed motion of either party or on stipulation. 
•1 t>- I j Judgment of legal separation be entered. 
>l c- j j Judgment of nullity be entered. The parties are declared to be unmarried persons on the ground of (specify): 
*1 cl. I I wife's former name be restored (specify): 
•
 e
 j j This judgment shall be entered nunc pro tunc as of (date): 
i \ f• j X I Jurisdiction is reserved over all other issues and all present orders remain in effect except as provided below. 
£ g. QQ other (specify): On 10/12/94, the Honorable Judge D. Cole made certain 
„ findings reflected in the attached Order incorporated herein as though 
• fully set forth. Among the Court's Findings and Orders, the Court, as a 
y result of the bad faith actions of Petitioner, ordered the Petitioner's 
o pleadings as to property only be stricken, and that the matter proceed 
by Default as to property issues. Custody and visitation was resolved by 
stipulation on 2/9/93. Please, see continuation of Item 3(g). 
h. Jurisdiction is reserved to make other orders necessary to carry out this judgment 
Date: 
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT 
4. Number of additional pages attached: I I Signature follows last attachment 
NOTICE 
Please review your will, insurance policies, retirement benefit plans, credit cards, other credit accounts and credit reports, and other 
matters you may want to change in view of the dieeoiution or annulment of your marriage, or your legal separation. 
A debt or obligation may be assigned to one party as part of the division of property and debts, but if that party does not pay the debt 
or obligation, the creditor may be able to collect from the other party. 
An earnings assignment will automatically be issued rf child support, family support, or spousal support is ordered. 
Form Adopted by Rule 1287 judiaai council of CaMomia 
1287 (Rev. January 1.1995) 
J U D G M E N T 
(Family Law) 
FamHy Code. 112340.2343.2346 
'/0226 
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
CASE No. RFL01543 
ATTACHMENT TO JUDGEMENT 
CONTINUATION OF ITEM 3(G) 
The issue of the status of the Marriage pursuant to a Motion 
to Bifurcate was heard and granted on 3/30/95. 
A single, all inclusive, Judgement is submitted to the Court 
for signature on the defaulted issues, stipulated issues, and 
status. 
FRIIS vs. FRIIS 
JUDGEMENT - Case No. RFL01543 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO 
Case No. RFL 01543 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ROBERT FRIIS 
VS. 
LINDA FRIIS 
Petitioner ) 
Respondent ) 
The court acquired jurisdiction over the respondent, Linda 
Friis, on August 18, 1993. The parties were married on January 
18 J 30, 1987, and separated on May 17, 1993, a period of 6 years and 
five months. There is one minor child, Denum Friis, D.O.B. 
December 13, 1990, born to this union. During the course of the 
marriage, irremediable and irreconcilable differences have arisen 
which have caused the total breakdown of the marriage. 
On February 9, 1994, the parties entered into a stipulation 
regarding permanent custody and visitation orders concerning the 
minor child, Denum Friis. Based upon the parties1 stipulation 
dated 2/9/94, it shall be the Order of the Court, except as 
modified by the court on 3/30/95, that: 
"Legal custody of the minor child of the parties, ROBERT 
0294 
1 I DENUM FRIIS, born 12/13/93, is awarded jointly to the parties. 
2 || Mutual consent of both parties shall be required for the major 
3 1 decisions relating to the child's health, education and welfare. 
4 I Failure to obtain consent may result in contempt action, jail 
5 I sentence, or change or loss of custody. Primary physical custody 
6 I for the care, custody and control of the minor child to be with 
7 I Respondent; however, Petitioner shall have physical care, custody 
8 I and control of the minor child as follows: 
9 1 a). Each month from the second Saturday at 8:00 a.m. 
10 to the third Sunday at 6:00 p.m. commencing February, 1994. 
11 1 b). Christmas 1994, the entire Christmas school 
12 vacation, commencing at 6:00 p.m. the last day of school before 
H 
13 I the vacation and ending at 6:00 p.m. the day before school 
14 I resumes, and thereafter on alternate years. 
15 1 c) • Thanksgiving vacation 1995, from 4:00 p.m. the day 
16 I before said vacation to 6:00 p.m. the day before school resumes 
17 I and thereafter on alternate years. 
18 I d). Summer vacation - 1994. One extra week in June, 
19 | July and August, which will be contiguous with regular custody 
20 I period to be determined by the parties. 
21 I During the six weeks of school vacation, while custody is 
22 I with Respondent, Petitioner will have weekend visitation from 
23 I Friday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m., during the 
24 1 midpoint of said period. 
25 I Pick up and delivery will be at the Police Station in 
26 I Parowan, Utah, with a 2 hour grace period. If either party 
27 I anticipates a delay beyond that "window11 they are required, as 
28 I 023^ 
soon as is practical, to advise the Watch Commander at Parowan 
Police Department of said delay and revised estimated time of 
arrival. 
Neither parent is to use disparaging remarks, nor allow any 
other person to use disparaging remarks, about the other parent 
in front of the child. 
Neither parent is to use corporal punishment on the minor 
child. 
Each parent should promote and encourage mutual respect and 
affection for the other parent. The child should be led to 
believe that it is appropriate for him to love and to value both 
mother and father". 
The above Stipulation and Order shall be modified in the 
following respects only: "Pick up time for Petitioner/father's 
visitation, shall be 4:00 p.m. There shall be a two hour grace 
period for pick up and return of the minor child. Respondent 
shall not withhold the child from Petitioner before 6:00 p.m. 
In the event Petitioner/father is more than two hours late 
at pick up time, he shall then forfeit his visitation for that 
particular month. 
In the event that Petitioner/father is more than two hours 
late in returning the minor child, he shall forfeit the next 
monthfs visitation. 
The exchange of the minor child shall occur at the Parowan 
Police Department. In the event that said Department is closed to 
the public at the time of the scheduled exchange, the exchange 
shall take place curbside at Respondent's residence. 
Marriage of FRIIS Cm%J 
On July 15, 1993 the court appointed Attorney James M. Steck 
2 J as Referee and Special Master for all assets, both community and 
3 separate, in the above entitled matter. 
4 I Between July 15, 1993 and October 12, 1994, numerous 
5 pretrial Order to Show Cause hearings and conferences were 
6 I conducted on all issues then pending in this court. The court 
7 I issued many pretrial orders. Ultimately, the court set the matter 
8 1 for a full disclosure hearing on September 29, 1994. Pursuant to 
9 the request of the Special Master James Steck. 
10 I The court, based upon the evidence submitted, testimony of 
11 I the parties and that of Petitionees daughter, Shawna Friis, who 
12 was joined as a party, and argument of counsel, the matter was 
13 taken under submission. 
14 On October 12, 1994, the court issued the following order: 
15 "Pursuant to the various and multiple hearings before this 
16 I Court, based upon previous Orders of this Court, Judge J Lewis 
17 Liesch and Judge Paul M. Bryant, and based upon the Disclosure 
18 Hearing of September 29, 1994, in Department "12" of the San 
19 I Bernardino Superior Court, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed: 
20 I 1. Shawna Friis, whose address is 6140 Cabernet, 
21 I Rancho Cucamonga, California, is hereby Joined in this action. 
22 I Ms. Shawna Friis is hereby ordered not to transfer, hypothecate, 
23 0 sell, trade, or dispose of certain Cessna airplane, transferred 
R 
24 | to her by Mr. Robert E. Friis. 
25 I 2. The Court finds that the transfer of the Cessna 
26 I airplane, for $1.00 (one dollar) consideration, is, by the 
27 I admission of Shawna Friis, a transfer without consideration and, 
I Marriaoe of FRIIS 02 D I 
I 
1 J pursuant to previous Court Orders, done for the explicit purpose 
2 || of avoiding multiple Court Orders and, as a result, Ms. Shawna 
3 1 Friis is hereby Ordered to return said Cessna airplane to the 
4 | Jurisdiction of this Court and to deposit said airplane, with the 
5 I Marshal of the County of San Bernardino, to be liened sold by the 
6 I Marshal of this County or, in a manner designated by this Court 
7 J or by law. 
8 I 3. The Court finds that the Respondent has 
9 I intentionally and deliberately failed to comply with the Orders 
10 of this Court, Judge Paul M. Bryant, and Judge J. Lewis Leisch, 
11 in regard to the transfer or sale of community assets, quasi-
12 community assets, or separate assets. 
13 I 4. The Court finds that the actions of Mr. Friis, in 
14 I relation to previous Orders of the Court, in relation to the 
15 8 Hearing of September 29, 1994, is clearly in bad faith. 
16 I That bad faith is clearly evidenced by the fact 
17 1 that the Court, by the Honorable Judge J. Lewis Leisch, Ordered 
18 I Mr. Robert E. Friis not to transfer any property, not to 
19 I dissipate any community assets, and not to secrete any assets. 
20 I Furthermore, said Order of the Judge J. Lewis 
21 8 Leisch was additionally made an Order of the Court by Judge Paul 
22 J M. Bryant, who extended that Order to any and all community, 
23 I quasi-community, or separate property assets. 
24 I By his own admission, Mr. Robert E. Friis has 
25 | dissipated the community, quasi-community, or separate property 
26 I assets in the real property, known as to the "Topaz Property11. 
27 i Mr. Robert E. Friis, by his own admission, has failed to make 
I Marriage of FRIIS 0230 
payment on that property for a considerable period of time and 
has allowed said property to be sold as a foreclosure sale. By 
his own admission, before the Court, Mr. Robert E. Friis has 
indicated that he is in arrears on said property in the sum 
between $21,000.00 and $25,000.00. 
5. The Court finds that this dissipation was 
deliberate and intentional and was done for the explicit purpose 
of defrauding the community and was done in contravention of 
Court Orders. Furthermore, the Court finds that this was a 
singular part of a plan, by Mr. Robert E. Friis, to dissipate 
said community properties. 
6. The Court finds that various assets have been 
moved to the State of Arizona, in order to avoid the Jurisdiction 
of this Court. By his own admission, in Court on September 29, 
1994, Mr. Robert E. Friis has moved several boats to the "Parker 
Property", which include a twelve (12) foot homemade boat, a 1992 
Jetmate Ski Boat, and other such boats not disclosed by him. 
7. The Court also finds that a Marlin Boat, that Mr# 
Robert E. Friis has indicated was taken by Ms. Friis, was in the 
possession of Mr. Robert E. Friis for a considerable time past 
separation and that boat has been conveniently "stolen" only 
recently. 
8. Additionally, pursuant to the sworn testimony of 
Mr. Robert E. Friis, certain furniture and furnishings have been 
either removed, sole, or secreted by Mr. Robert E. Friis. 
9. Pursuant to the testimony of Mr. Robert E. Friis 
and the offer of proof of Ms. Linda Friis1s attorney, a certain 
1988 Comfort Motorhome and a certain 1989 Harley Davidson 
Motorcycle, were sold, in contravention of the Court Order and in 
a direct contradiction of the prior testimony of Mr. Robert E. 
Friis. Pursuant to the offer of proof of Mr. Smolin, the Court 
finds that the automobile and motorhome were in possession of Mr. 
Robert E. Friis, quite recently, and was not sold fifteen (15) 
days after separation. 
10. The Court finds that Mr. Robert E. Friis has 
either sold or secreted other automobiles in the Riverside 
warehouse of Mr. Haller on Van Buren and Riverside. The Court 
Orders that Mr. Robert E. Friis and/or Mr. Haller, if 
appropriate, return all such automobiles to the jurisdiction of 
this Court. 
11. The Court finds that a certain Campbell Boat and 
Trailer has been secreted, within the State of Arizona, at the 
"Parker Arizona Property11, in order to avoid the Jurisdiction of 
this Court. Mr. Robert E. Friis is Ordered to immediately return 
any Campbell Boat and Trailer to this Jurisdiction. 
12. As a result of the bad faith actions of the 
Petitioner herein, the Court hereby Orders that the pleadings be 
stricken as to Mr. Robert E. Friis and that the matter proceed by 
Default. Counsel for Mr. Linda Friis is hereby Ordered to list, 
with singularity, any and all items, whether automobiles, boats, 
or of a similar nature, and any and all furniture and furnishings 
25 | claimed, to be presented to the Court for itfs signature. 
Pursuant to that Judgment, the Court has hereby instructed the 
attorney for Ms. Linda M. Friis, to prepare a declaration by Ms. 
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Linda M. friis attesting to the community property of that 
property. 
13. The Court finds that Mr. Robert Friis has utilized 
community property for his own separate property interest, has 
dissipated community property as hereinabove described, and has 
acted in a manner of exceedingly bad faith with this Court. 
Therefore, the Court does hereby Order the sale of all community 
property, in the possession of Mr. Robert E. Friis, or under his 
domain and control and the return of any and all property to Ms. 
Linda M. Friis, as dictated in the Judgment. 
14. The Marshall, for the County of San Bernardino, is 
hereby appointed, as far as able, under the laws of the State of 
California, to sell any and all property under this Order or the 
following Judgment. 
15. Additionally, pursuant to the relevant Code 
Sections, the Court does hereby find that the actions of Mr. 
Robert E. Friis are a direct breach of his fiduciary relationship 
to the community, his dissipation of community assets under his 
control, are a result of bad faith actions, pursuant to Family 
Code paragraph 271 and Code of Civil Procedure paragraph 128.5 
and that, punitive damages, in the amount of fifty percent (50%) 
of all assets so ascertained, shall be charged against Mr. Robert 
E. Friis. 
16. The Court makes the finding, to and for any Courts 
of competent Jurisdiction, that this action by the Court, is 
punitive in nature, and is a result of fraud, bad faith, breach 
of fiduciary relationship and many other tortious acts committed 
026*7 
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by Mr. Robert E. Friis. 
17. The Court further finds that other individuals, 
not a party to this action from the onset, have acted in 
conspiracy with Mr. Robert E. Friis in order to avoid the 
Jurisdiction of this Court, to defraud the Court, and to act in 
bad faith. 
As a result, the Court retains Jurisdiction over 
all assets of this marriage, all quasi-community assets, and all 
separate property assets of Mr. Robert E. Friis. As a result, any 
individuals who are found to have conspired with Mr. Robert E. 
Friis, for the actions hereinabove described, shall, by Ex-Parte 
Motion, be deemed joined to this action in order to explain any 
such conspiracies." 
On 3/30/95, the matter came on calendar regularly upon 
Respondent's Notice of Motion to amend her Response, bifurcate 
the issue of status, correct a clerical error in the Order of 
October 12, 1994, and clarification of item 15, page 4, of the 
October 12, 1994 Order. 
The Court hereby grants Respondent's request to amend her 
Response, to specify with particularity the separate property 
assets and community assets of the parties. The Court hereby 
grants Respondent's request to bifurcate on the issue of status 
and status was adjudicated. The Court, pursuant to Respondent's 
request to correct a clerical error, grants the relief prayed for 
and on page 2, item 3, line 7 and deletes the word "Respondent" 
and inserts the word "Petitioner, Robert E. Friis". 
The Court orders that Special Master James Steck, clarify 
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1 I page 4, item 15, lines 27 and 28. 
2 I Upon inquiry of Special Mater James Steck, regarding 
3 I clarification of page 4, item 15, lines 27 and 28, "...punitive 
4 | damage in the amount of fifty percent (50%) of all assets so 
5 I ascertained, shall be charged against Mr. Robert Friis shall 
6 1 include all community and separate property of Mr. Friis in 
7 I calculating punitive damages based upon Respondent's amended 
8 I Response and Schedule of Assets and Debts filed on 3/30/94. 
9 I Specifically, the Respondent shall be awarded the following 
10 I items based upon the Court's Findings and Order of October 12, 
11 I 1994 and March 30, 1995: 
12 1 1. The community equity, at the time of 
I separation, in the family residence located 
•13 I at 5282 Topaz Street, Alta Loma, CA. 
A (Asset value: $230,000.00 -
14 I Encumbrance: $198,000.00) $32,000.00 
I 2. 221 Stardust Lane, Parker, AA, 
15 I Parcel #2264701-014 $85,000.00 
I 3. Parcel # 0334343020000, Lake Arrowhead, CA $90,000.00 
16 I 4. Parcel # 0333545010000, Lake Arrowhead, CA $30,000.00 
U 5. 1976 Jaguar $2,000.00 
17 I 6. 1984 Chevrolet Corvette $5,200.00 
7. 1987 BMW 325i $4,325.00 
18 | 8. 1976 Ford Cobra (Lie. Plate #C0BRA EP) $4,000.00 
I 9. 1967 Chevrolet Chevelle $3,500.00 
19 I 10. 1987 Mazdza Truck $3,135.00 | 11. 1983 Chevrolet S-10 Truck $2,400.00 
20 I 12. 1989 Ford Escort $3,000.00 
I 13. 1988 Dodge Omni $2,200.00 
21 | 14. 1985 Buick Park Avenue $2,110.00 
J 15. 1988 Jeep Cherokee Wagon $4,900.00 
22 | 16. 1986 Ford Truck $4,400.00 
I 17. 1989 Toyota Truck $3,900.00 
23 I 18. 1987 Dodge Truck $1,475.00 
I 19. 1988 Ford Taurus $3,500.00 
24 I 20. 1979 Ford Bronco $2,300.00 
I 21. 1986 Honda Motorcycle $490.00 
25 I 22. 1984 Ford Mustang Convertible $3,500.00 | 23. 1977 Chevrolet Montecarlo $100.00 
26 I 24. 1986 Honda Prelude $460.00 
I 25. 1988 Comfort Motorhome 
27 | Lie. Plate # 2WFG968 
J (Vehicle ID #1GBKP37W8J3323930) $25,000.00 
28 I 
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26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
1988 Marlin Mercruiser (Ocean Boat) 
OB849229 
(Vehicle ID #EKWCE118A888) 
1988 Lomac Boat Trailer 
Lie. Plate #U136192 
(Vehicle ID# 427TB25B4JX000507) 
1989 Harley Davidson Motorcycle 
Lie. Plate #12C5266 
(Vehicle ID #1HD1BLL32KY018623) 
1969 Crestline Boat and Trailer 
1989 Campbell Boat and Trailer 
Two (2) Kawasakii Jetskis with trailer 
Twelve (12) Foot Runabout Boat with trailer 
Catameran Boat and trailer 
Dico Double Deck Dune Buggy trailer 
Lie. Plate #2FT4437 
(Vehicle ID #10DBB19D4GA002439) 
Sandrail, four seater 
Rock Dune Buggy 
Honda ATV Three Wheeler 
1974 Chevrolet Suburban 
Lie. Plate #12C5266 
(Vehicle ID #CCZ264F102616) 
Yamaha ATV Four Wheeler 
Honda ATV, Three Wheeler 
1989 Honda Elite Motorcycle 
1967 Honda 90 Moped 
Airplane, Cessna 182 #N8601T 
Parcel # 100633130-A068 
1984 Chevrolet Station Wagon 
Two (2) 18-speed mountain bikes 
10-speed bike 
Tricycle 
Antique Pool Table 
Complete set pure ivory pool balls 
Standard set pool balls 
Tadd Pool Que 
Seven standard pool gues 
Ocean scene oil painting 
Farm scene oil painting 
Antique sewing machine with solid oak case 
Solid oak kitchen table 
Six oak kitchen chairs 
Microwave oven 
Microwave oven (river) 
6E Refrigerator 
GE Refrigerator (river) 
Six Persian Rugs 
Complete kitchen furnishings (silverware, 
pots, pans, dishes, etc.) 
Complete kitchen furnishings (river) 
Complete kitchen furnishings (motorhome) 
48" Mitsubishi TV 
30M Magnavox color TV (river) 
$25,000.00 
$5,000.00 
$15,000.00 
$800.00 
$25,000.00 
$3,000.00 
$2,500.00 
$1,500.00 
$1,500.00 
$7,500.00 
$2,000.00 
$1,100.00 
$4,000.00 
$1,500.00 
$1,200.00 
$1,200.00 
$300.00 
$40,000.00 
$500.00 
$600.00 
$100.00 
$20.00 
$5,000.00 
$3,000.00 
$50.00 
$1,500.00 
$100.00 
$300.00 
$200.00 
$1,500.00 
$1,500.00 
$600.00 
$150.00 
$150.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$2,500.00 
$750.00 
$750.00 
$500.00 
$2,500.00 
$500.00 
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68. TWO 24" RCA TVs $300.00 
69. Four Ritan rocker swivel chairs $200.00 
70. Two oak and glass tables $200.00 
71. Couch and love seat $200.00 
72. Solid Oak desk and chair $800.00 
73. IBM compatible computer and laser printer $1,500.00 
74. Solid Oak file cabinet $400.00 
75. Maytag washing machine $250.00 
76. Maytag washing machine (river) $250.00 
77. Maytag gas drier $200.00 
78. Maytag gas drier $200.00 
79. Six porcelain plate collection $250.00 
80. Nine brass lamps (three hanging, six table) $500.00 
81. Bunk bed, twin top and double bottom $400.00 
8 | 82. Eight piece solid oak bedroom w/California 
king mattress $3,850.00 
83. Five piece oak and brass bedroom set 
w/double box spring and mattress $2,000.00 
10 I 84. Queen size solid wood bedroom set (river) $500.00 
85. Five piece solid wood bedroom set 
1 1 II w/California king box spring and mattress $1,200.00 
86. All Linda's personal items 
12 | (wardrobe, jewelry, etc.) $3,000.00 
I 87. One two man handwoven hammock $600.00 
13 I 88. Five piece hand made willow outdoor furniture $750.00 
I 89. Outdoor patio table and chair $200.00 
14 I 86. Approx. 1220 Feet Christmas lights and 
I accompanying extension cord $850.00 
15 I 87. Upright toy chest, hand painted, with the 
I name Denim inscribed $150.00 
16 I 88. Antiques oak child's desk w/porcelain handles 
I and chair $250.00 
17 I 89. Dirt Devil vacuum cleaner $50.00 
J 90. Hoover vacuum cleaner (river) $50.00 
18 I 91. Bissel carpet shampooer $75.00 
I 92. Trampoline $300.00 
19 I 93. Antique porcelain doll w/peach silk gown $1,800.00 
I 94. Two Samsung VCRs $200.00 
20 I 95. One Samsung VCR (river) $100.00 
I 96. Solid wood dining room table with chairs $400.00 
21 J 97. Couch and love seat set (river) $300.00 
I 98. Blender, hand mixer, coffee maker, food 
22 I processor, and toaster $150.00 
I 99. Double stack Craftsman tool chest and 
23 I tools $1,500.00 
I 100. Double stack Craftsman tool chest and 
24 I tools ($1,500.00) $1,500.00 
I 101. Automobile hydraulic floor jack $50.00 
25 | 102. Four motorcycle helmets $100.00 
I 103. Minolta camera w/two lenses $750.00 
26 I 104. Camcorder and tripod $500.00 
I 105. Two stainless steel swords (Linda's family 
27 I heirloom) $500.00 
I 106. Shovel, rake and hoe $25.00 
28 1 
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1 I 107. Shovel, rake and hoe (river) $25.00 
108. Lawn mower $75.00 
2 | 109. Gas weed eater $65.00 
110. Electric weed eater (river) $40.00 
3 | ill. Ten garden hoses $100.00 
1 112. Linens, blankets and bedspreads, six bedrooms $600.00 
4 113. Towels to furnish four bathrooms (two homes) $400.00 
I 114. Twelve life preserver/jackets and ski ropes $250.00 
5 I 115. Miscellaneous home decor items (two homes) $1,000.00 
I 116. Reimbursement of Attorney fees paid to the 
6 | Law Office of Ferrazzo and Ferrazzo $87,000.00 
I 117. Monetary Judgement in favor of Robert Friis, 
7 J in Friis vs. Vides (amount unknown at this 
time. Will supplement when ascertained) UNKNOWN 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
TOTAL * $597,670.00 + item 117 above, Amount of Monetary 
Judgement. 
The respondent, Linda Friis, shall be awarded, as 
punitive damages, the sum of $298,835.00 + 50% of the 
Monetary Judgement reflected in item 117 above. 
The Court shall reserve jurisdiction over the issues of 
Respondents request for attorney fees for Attorney Richard 
Smolin, counsel for Respondent; Attorney Michael Darlington, 
counsel for the minor child; fees for the appointed Special 
Master, Attorney James Steck and fees for the appointed real 
estate agent, Sandy Schaeffer, until Order of the Court. 
Due to the Petitioner's fraudulent conduct in disposing 
of Community, Quasi-Community and Separate Property, the 
Court reserves jurisdiction over all omitted or undisclosed 
assets of the parties including, but not limited to, all 
vehicles, motorvehicles, boats, trailers and motorcycles 
listed, which are not specifically identified by VIN number 
and or License Plate Number, due to Respondent's lack of 
access to said information. Specifically, the Court shall 
retain Jurisdiction over these assets to clarify or amend 
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this Judgement upon ascertainment of any and/or all VIN 
numbers and/or license plate numbers for those vehicles 
listed in this Judgement without such identifying 
information. 
The respondent is granted leave of the Court, upon Ex-
parte application, to amend or clarify this Judgement in 
relation to these vehicles, motorvehicles, boats, trailers 
and motorcycles. 
Upon location and/or recovery of any and/or all of the 
items awarded to Respondent in this matter, the Court 
reserves jurisdiction to make any necessary and proper 
orders regarding the method and manner that said items are 
to be disposed of, sold, or otherwise liquidated and/or 
reduced to possession by Respondent, Linda Friis. 
Respondent shall be granted leave of Court, upon Ex* 
parte application, to secure any and/or all necessary and 
proper orders concerning the method and manner that said 
items are to be disposed and/or reduced to possession by 
Respondent upon location and/^: recovery. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. / / / ^ / 
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